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        <title><![CDATA[Uncategorized - Doyle, Barlow & Mazard]]></title>
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        <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/categories/uncategorized/</link>
        <description><![CDATA[Doyle, Barlow & Mazard PLLC's Website]]></description>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 19:28:27 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC and 17 States Secure $63 Million Settlement with Family Dollar Over Deceptive Shelf Pricing]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-and-17-states-secure-63-million-settlement-with-family-dollar-over-deceptive-shelf-pricing/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-and-17-states-secure-63-million-settlement-with-family-dollar-over-deceptive-shelf-pricing/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 17:14:51 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC Consumer Protection Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On November 12, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission and attorneys general from 17 states announced a $63 million settlement resolving allegations that Family Dollar Stores, LLC routinely charged customers more at the register than the prices displayed on shelves, price tags, advertisements, its website, and its mobile app. The case was filed in the U.S.&hellip;</p>
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<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On November 12, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission and attorneys general from 17 states announced a $63 million settlement resolving allegations that Family Dollar Stores, LLC routinely charged customers more at the register than the prices displayed on shelves, price tags, advertisements, its website, and its mobile app. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia alongside a proposed stipulated final order. The Commission authorized the complaint and order by a 2-0 vote.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Allegations</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the complaint, thousands of Family Dollar stores nationwide engaged in widespread pricing discrepancies that cost consumers millions of dollars. The practices were particularly harmful in low-income communities with limited access to full-service grocery stores. State and local regulators had cited the company for thousands of pricing violations over the prior five years, generating more than $3 million in fines. In the three years before the FTC action, Family Dollar had already entered multiple settlements with state attorneys general and consumer-protection agencies, paying more than $800,000 in penalties for inaccurate pricing—yet the overcharges continued.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The complaint further alleges that Family Dollar charged higher prices at the register than those listed on its website and mobile app. Consumers repeatedly reported that they could not redeem “Smart Coupons” discounts because the app failed to function at checkout. Internal company records showed consumer complaints about the same mobile-app problems stretching back six years. Despite thousands of failed regulatory inspections, hundreds of consumer complaints, and repeated enforcement actions, Family Dollar allegedly failed to correct the deceptive pricing practices and continued making false pricing representations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The participating states are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Settlement</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under the proposed order, Family Dollar must:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Establish a $40 million consumer redress fund for eligible purchasers (those who bought items at Family Dollar between January 1, 2023, and October 1, 2026). The company must post clear notices of the fund in stores and on its digital platforms.</li>



<li>Create a $20 million discount program for Family Dollar customers.</li>



<li>Pay more than $3 million to the participating states.</li>



<li>Cease misrepresenting the prices of its goods or services.</li>



<li>Implement a pricing-accuracy program that requires regular monitoring and verification of prices, employee training to identify discrepancies, and prompt correction of errors so that customers are charged the prices advertised or displayed. The program must be independently assessed and annually certified.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Family Dollar did not admit or deny the allegations. The order remains subject to court approval.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Related Enforcement: Dollar General</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Family Dollar settlement follows a related complaint the FTC and 20 states filed on October 26, 2026, against Dollar General Corporation alleging substantially similar deceptive pricing-accuracy practices. That litigation remains ongoing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Takeaways</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The action underscores the FTC’s and states’ continued focus on price transparency at the point of sale, especially for retailers serving lower-income consumers. Persistent shelf-to-register discrepancies—documented through consumer complaints, failed inspections, prior settlements, and internal records—can support claims under the FTC Act and parallel state consumer-protection statutes. The settlement’s combination of monetary redress, a forward-looking discount program, and a monitored pricing-accuracy program with independent assessment illustrates the relief enforcers are seeking in these cases. Retailers that rely on high volumes of low-priced goods should treat shelf, tag, circular, website, and app pricing accuracy as a core compliance priority, particularly where prior regulatory warnings or settlements exist.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andre Barlow</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
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                <title><![CDATA[USITC Enters New Leadership Era with Doyle as Chairman]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/usitc-enters-new-leadership-era-with-doyle-as-chairman/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/usitc-enters-new-leadership-era-with-doyle-as-chairman/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2026 15:06:33 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>A change in the leadership of the U.S. International Trade Commission is now underway. Following the Senate’s confirmation of five nominees on July 16, 2026, Brett Doyle has been selected to lead the agency as its new Chairman. Doyle’s appointment to the leadership position came shortly after he formally joined the Commission. He took office&hellip;</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A change in the leadership of the U.S. International Trade Commission is now underway. Following the Senate’s confirmation of five nominees on July 16, 2026, Brett Doyle has been selected to lead the agency as its new Chairman.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Doyle’s appointment to the leadership position came shortly after he formally joined the Commission. He took office as a commissioner on July 17, one day after receiving Senate confirmation, and President Donald J. Trump selected him as Chairman on July 20. His chairmanship is scheduled to continue until June 16, 2028, while his service as a commissioner is set to run through December 16, 2030.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The change also concludes a brief period of interim leadership. David S. Johanson had been performing the duties of Chairman under the Commission’s succession rules after Amy A. Karpel’s term in that role ended on June 16, 2026.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Five Confirmations Reshape the Commission</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Doyle was one of five USITC nominees approved by the Senate on July 16. The Senate also confirmed David Foley, Jr., Samuel Negatu, Peter-Anthony Pappas, and Bartholomew Thanhauser.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The group of confirmations represents an unusually broad change in the makeup of the six-member Commission. As the newly confirmed members take office, the agency is positioned to return to full membership with a substantially different group of commissioners than it had only weeks earlier.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Doyle will therefore begin his tenure as Chairman while the Commission is simultaneously integrating several new members. The appointment places him at the center of an institutional transition rather than a routine change in leadership.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Background in Trade and Government Relations</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Doyle arrives at the Commission after serving as Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Congressional Affairs. His responsibilities in that position included managing USTR’s interactions with Congress on trade negotiations, proposed legislation, tariffs, and enforcement issues.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">His career has also included government service at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and in the U.S. Senate. Outside the federal government, Doyle worked in senior government-relations positions at Sylvamo and the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He attended Lafayette College and the U.S. Naval War College.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Doyle’s professional background combines trade policy experience with congressional and government-affairs work. That experience will provide the backdrop for his leadership of a Commission whose membership has been almost entirely reconstituted.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The coming months will offer the first indication of how the new group of commissioners approaches its work collectively and how Doyle manages the administrative responsibilities of the chairmanship during the transition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC Chairman Ferguson Launches Healthcare Task Force for Coordinated Enforcement and Advocacy]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-chairman-ferguson-launches-healthcare-task-force-for-coordinated-enforcement-and-advocacy/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-chairman-ferguson-launches-healthcare-task-force-for-coordinated-enforcement-and-advocacy/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 16:27:00 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Chairman Ferguson Launches Healthcare Task Force for Coordinated Enforcement and Advocacy On March 20, 2026, Federal Trade Commission Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson directed staff to form a Healthcare Task Force. The initiative is designed to take a coordinated, integrated approach to competition and consumer-protection enforcement and advocacy across the healthcare sector, with the stated goal&hellip;</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong> Chairman Ferguson Launches Healthcare Task Force for Coordinated Enforcement and Advocacy</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On March 20, 2026, Federal Trade Commission Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson directed staff to form a Healthcare Task Force. The initiative is designed to take a coordinated, integrated approach to competition and consumer-protection enforcement and advocacy across the healthcare sector, with the stated goal of protecting patients, healthcare workers, and taxpayers. It aligns with President Trump’s executive order directing efforts to create a more competitive, innovative, affordable, and higher-quality healthcare system.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Structure and Mandate</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a memorandum to bureau and office leadership, Chairman Ferguson instructed the Bureaus of Competition, Consumer Protection, and Economics, together with the Office of Policy Planning and the Office of Technology, to establish the Task Force. The group will be co-chaired by one representative each from the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protection, with additional members from each bureau and from the Offices of Policy Planning, Technology, and General Counsel. It is expected to meet monthly and report to the Chairman quarterly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Task Force’s core functions include:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Leading targeted enforcement and advocacy initiatives focused on key priorities;</li>



<li>Developing coordinated, agency-wide strategies for investigations;</li>



<li>Taking a proactive approach to identifying opportunities for amicus briefs and statements of interest; and</li>



<li>Conducting horizon-scanning to identify emerging issues and new priority areas for enforcement and advocacy.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Task Force will also seek to expand its membership and collaboration to include other federal partners, notably the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice. Through this structure, the agency intends to share knowledge, market intelligence, case leads, and resources across its dual competition and consumer-protection mandates.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Recent Enforcement Context</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The announcement frames the Task Force as a continuation and institutionalization of the FTC’s recent healthcare work. The agency highlighted several actions from the prior year, including a landmark settlement with Express Scripts requiring practice changes expected to lower patients’ out-of-pocket drug costs (including for insulin) by up to $7 billion over ten years; a successful challenge to Edwards’ proposed acquisition of JenaValve that preserved competition on innovation and product quality; the abandonment of the proposed Alcon-Lensar merger of cataract-surgery device makers, preserving competition on price and innovation; securing $145 million in consumer redress from companies alleged to have misled consumers seeking health insurance; and action against substance-abuse treatment facilities that used deceptive telemarketing practices, yielding $2.4 million in redress.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These examples illustrate the range of issues—pharmacy-benefit-manager practices, medical-device mergers, consumer deception in insurance and treatment marketing—that the Task Force is intended to address in a more coordinated fashion.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Implications</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By creating a cross-bureau structure with an explicit interagency component, the Healthcare Task Force signals that healthcare will remain a sustained priority under the current Commission. The emphasis on coordinated investigative strategies, proactive amicus work, and identification of emerging issues suggests both continued scrutiny of traditional competition concerns (such as provider and device mergers) and expanded attention to consumer-protection problems involving pricing transparency, marketing, and data practices. The invitation to partner with HHS and the Department of Justice further indicates that healthcare stakeholders may encounter coordinated federal inquiries that draw on multiple agencies’ authorities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For hospitals, physician groups, pharmacy-benefit managers, device manufacturers, and other industry participants, the formation of the Task Force reinforces the value of early assessment of antitrust and consumer-protection risk and of preparing for a more integrated enforcement posture across the federal government. The initiative institutionalizes the FTC’s dual-mandate approach to healthcare and positions the agency to act more systematically on both existing and emerging issues in the sector.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andre Barlow</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[CIT Decision on Constitutionality of Section 232]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/cit-decision-on-constitutionality-of-section-232-2/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/cit-decision-on-constitutionality-of-section-232-2/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 23 Sep 2025 14:31:52 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>A lawsuit commenced by the American Institute for International Steel (“AIIS”) regarding the constitutionality of Section 232 before the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) has been decided.&nbsp; A three-judge panel decided that Section 232 was not unconstitutional. The plaintiffs argued that Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, did not properly&hellip;</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>A lawsuit commenced by the American Institute for International Steel (“AIIS”) regarding the constitutionality of Section 232 before the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) has been decided.&nbsp; A three-judge panel decided that Section 232 was not unconstitutional.</p>



<p>The plaintiffs argued that Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, did not properly delegate authority to the Executive Branch because there is no “intelligible principle” under which Section 232 authorizes presidential action.</p>



<p>CIT determined that Section 232 did, in fact, meet the “intelligible principle” standard to uphold Section 232’s constitutionality.&nbsp; In reaching its decision, the CIT relied on a 1976 case, <em>Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG Inc.</em>, 426 U.S. 548 (1976), where the Supreme Court upheld a similar challenge against Section 232, finding that Section 232 “establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action. . . .”</p>



<p>Plaintiffs attempted to distinguish the 1976 case from the one before it, but ultimately failed to convince the three-judge panel that the <em>Algonquin</em>was not binding on the CIT.</p>



<p>Despite the outcome, there are avenues for appeal.&nbsp; The case can be appealed to the Supreme Court, where the Highest Court can revisit its earlier rulings and revise the law.&nbsp; Despite the difficulty in overruling an earlier Supreme Court decision, one judge on the CIT panel expressed “grave doubts” about the 1976 decision that was binding on the CIT.&nbsp; Judge Katzmann did not dissent from the opinion, and maintained that he was bound by earlier precedent, but maintained skepticism that the earlier decision was right.&nbsp; Judge Katzmann expressed concern that Section 232 violates the spirit of Separation of Powers embedded in the Constitution because it:</p>



<p>“provides virtually unbridled discretion to the President with respect to the power over trade that is reserved by the Constitution to Congress. Nor does the statute require congressional approval of any presidential actions that fall within its scope. In short, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the statute has permitted the transfer of power to the President in violation of the separation of powers.”</p>



<p>AIIS already announced its decision to appeal the decision, so time will tell whether the Supreme Court will revisit its earlier precedent.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[DOJ Wins Google Ad Tech Antitrust Trial]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/doj-wins-google-ad-tech-antitrust-trial/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/doj-wins-google-ad-tech-antitrust-trial/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 05 May 2025 14:35:00 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Antitrust Litigation Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Civil Non-Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[ad tech]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[adtech]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[antitrust]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Antitrust Division]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[deparment of justice]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[google]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[remedies]]></category>
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On April 17, 2025, U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema of the Eastern District of Virginia ruled in United States et al. v. Google LLC that Google violated Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The court found that Google had willfully acquired and maintained monopoly power in three key markets within open-web display advertising: publisher&hellip;</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>On April 17, 2025, U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema of the Eastern District of Virginia ruled in <em>United States et al. v. Google LLC</em> that Google violated Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The court found that Google had willfully acquired and maintained monopoly power in three key markets within open-web display advertising: publisher ad servers (with Google holding about 90% market share), ad exchanges (about 50% share), and advertiser ad networks (about 50% share). The judge determined that Google’s anticompetitive conduct included strategic acquisitions (such as DoubleClick in 2008 and AdMeld in 2011), product tying (e.g., requiring publishers to use Google’s AdX exchange with its DFP ad server), exclusive dealing arrangements, and manipulative auction practices that disadvantaged competitors and inflated costs for advertisers and publishers. This conduct harmed competition by creating barriers to entry, reducing innovation, and enabling Google to extract supracompetitive fees (estimated at 30-36% per transaction). The ruling emphasized Google’s dominance in the “ad tech stack,” which processes trillions of ad impressions annually, but did not find liability in a fourth alleged market for indirect advertiser buying tools.</p>



<p>The decision followed a bench trial that began in September 2024 and lasted 15 days, with closing arguments in November 2024. It marks the second major antitrust loss for Google in less than a year, following a separate ruling on its search monopoly.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-remedy-trial-timeline">Remedy Trial Timeline</h3>



<p>The remedies phase, which will determine how to address Google’s anticompetitive behavior, is scheduled to begin as a bench trial on September 22, 2025, in the same court before Judge Brinkema. Both parties proposed this date shortly after the liability ruling, and it was confirmed by the court in early May 2025. The trial is expected to focus on evidence and arguments for specific remedies, with a decision potentially following in the months after.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-proposed-remedies-to-resolve-the-judge-s-concerns">Proposed Remedies to Resolve the Judge’s Concerns</h3>



<p>The remedies aim to dismantle Google’s integrated ad tech monopoly, restore competition, and prevent future anticompetitive practices as outlined in the ruling (e.g., tying, exclusive deals, auction manipulation, and data advantages). Proposals from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and plaintiff states are more aggressive, emphasizing structural changes, while Google’s counterproposals focus on behavioral adjustments. Key proposals include:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>DOJ and States’ Proposals (Structural and Behavioral Remedies)</strong>:
<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Divestiture of Key Assets</strong>: Force Google to sell off significant portions of its ad tech business, such as Google Ad Manager (which includes the DFP ad server and AdX exchange). This would break up the “walled garden” that gives Google end-to-end control over ad transactions.</li>



<li><strong>Data and Bidding Restrictions</strong>: Ban Google from using first-party data from its own products (e.g., YouTube, Search, or Android) to gain unfair advantages in ad bidding or pricing. This addresses concerns about Google’s ability to leverage its ecosystem for preferential treatment.</li>



<li><strong>Auction and Pricing Reforms</strong>: Prohibit manipulative practices like “last look” advantages in auctions (where Google could adjust bids after seeing competitors’) and require fair, non-discriminatory auction rules to prevent rigging.</li>



<li><strong>Interoperability and Non-Exclusivity</strong>: Mandate that Google’s tools be compatible with rivals’ products, end exclusive contracts with publishers and advertisers, and allow easier switching to competitors.</li>



<li><strong>Oversight and Compliance</strong>: Implement monitoring by a court-appointed trustee for up to 10 years, with potential fines for violations.</li>
</ul>
</li>



<li><strong>Google’s Counterproposals (Primarily Behavioral)</strong>:
<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Avoid divestitures, arguing they exceed the scope of the ruling and could harm innovation and users. Instead, propose tweaks to auction mechanics (e.g., “rigging ad auctions a little less”) and limited changes to product tying without breaking up assets.</li>



<li>Focus on transparency enhancements, such as better data sharing with competitors or minor adjustments to fee structures, to mitigate monopoly effects without structural separation.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>



<p>The DOJ argues that behavioral remedies alone have proven insufficient in past cases (e.g., Microsoft’s antitrust settlement), necessitating divestitures to fully resolve the integration that fueled Google’s monopoly. The court will weigh these during the September trial, with potential appeals likely regardless of the outcome.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Epic Games Seeks Injunctive Relief After Apple Removes Popular Game]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/epic-games-seeks-injunctive-relief-after-apple-removes-popular-game/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/epic-games-seeks-injunctive-relief-after-apple-removes-popular-game/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2020 03:29:21 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Epic Games, creator of the popular multi-platform game Fortnite, has filed a complaint in federal district court seeking injunctive relief after Apple booted the game from its App Store.[1] &nbsp;The event was kicked off when Epic Games introduced the ability to pay for in-app purchases directly through Epic Games, rather than through Apple’s in-app payment&hellip;</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Epic Games, creator of the popular multi-platform game Fortnite, has filed a complaint in federal district court seeking injunctive relief after Apple booted the game from its App Store.<a href="//498F33F7-5FDE-4C32-BBEC-5088817ADF6B#_ftn1">[1]</a> &nbsp;The event was kicked off when Epic Games introduced the ability to pay for in-app purchases directly through Epic Games, rather than through Apple’s in-app payment processing.&nbsp; Apple requires that any in-app purchases for apps available in Apple’s App Store must be processed by Apple and that Apple collects a 30% commission on such sales.</p>



<p>Apple’s 30% commission has attracted criticism from app developers claiming that the commission is unfair and a product of anticompetitive practices.&nbsp; Developers must create apps for a particular operating system (“OS”), and in the case of iPhones and iPads, that includes the iPhone OS (“iOS”).&nbsp; Apps developed for the iOS must be specifically programmed and, as such, cannot be used for Android OS, Windows OS, or even Mac OS.&nbsp; Once the app is developed for the iOS, the app is solely distributed through Apple’s App Store, where apps compete against each other for consumer selection.</p>



<p>Epic Games described in their complaint that there are two markets in which Apple has engaged in anticompetitive conduct.&nbsp; The first is in the app-distribution market, where Apple’s App Store is the only method by which developers can sell their products to consumers.&nbsp; Second, Apple has engaged in anticompetitive conduct in the in-app payment processing market by not allowing other methods of payment processing.</p>



<p>Companies including Facebook, Spotify, and Microsoft have complained about Apple’s policy of prohibiting alternative methods of app distribution.&nbsp; Microsoft, for example, announced a cloud-based gaming service powered by its popular Xbox Game Pass service which would allow consumers to play Xbox games across multiple devices and platforms.&nbsp; Microsoft, however, will not provide this offering for iOS users because Apple maintains that Microsoft’s offering is, in effect, a rival “store” in which consumers can download games that is separate from Apple’s App Store.&nbsp; Facebook, too, had to withdraw their plans for releasing their Gaming App on iOS because it was an app that allowed consumers to download games from Facebook rather than from the Apple’s App Store.</p>



<p>In the in-app payment processing market which Epic Games alleges exists, Apple controls the means by which consumers pay for certain in-app purchases so that Apple can receive its 30 % commission.&nbsp; Epic Games is not the only company to challenge this conduct.&nbsp; Spotify also sought relief from Apple as they claimed that Apple’s 30 % commission caused Spotify to increase its monthly subscription price on the App store from $10 to $13, causing them to abandon in-app payments altogether and requiring subscribers to pay on Spotify’s website.</p>



<p>The lawsuit seeking injunctive relief, in particular, claims that Apple’s practices in these two markets are anticompetitive; however, a court will have to determine whether to accept Epic Games’ market definitions.&nbsp; The complaint defines the markets narrowly, arguing the relevant market for examination is iOS in-app payment processing and iOS app distribution.&nbsp; Epic Games offers many justifications for why these markets should be the relevant markets for antitrust examination.&nbsp; Apple has previously fended off such lawsuits by arguing the relevant market for analysis is the global smartphone market.&nbsp; Indeed, devices with iOS have significantly less global market share than Android and Windows devices.&nbsp; If iOS users are unhappy or unsatisfied with Apple’s App Store offering, Apple reasons, consumers can simply switch to a product with a different OS.</p>



<p>Epic responds to the Apple’s point by arguing that Apple’s ecosystem creates network effects for its iOS, thereby reducing the incentive for developers and consumers to simply opt-out of iOS products or to switch to a different OS.&nbsp; Once a consumer purchases an Apple product with iOS, it is effectively “locked in” to Apple’s products.&nbsp; Apple has cultivated an ecosystem consisting of products, apps, ancillary hardware, and more, which allow Apple consumers to coordinate and harmonize their Apple experience across multiple devices.&nbsp; Given these investments into Apple’s ecosystems, consumers are unlikely to simply switch OS because an app is unavailable on the Apple’s App Store, and developers are unlikely to forfeit billions of iOS users.</p>



<p>There is no question that Epic Games is capitalizing on a moment where Apple is under intense scrutiny regarding alleged anticompetitive conduct. &nbsp;The EU announced that it was launching an antitrust investigation into Apple’s App store after a complaint initiated by Spotify; the Supreme Court last year ruled that plaintiffs may bring an antitrust lawsuit against Apple for its App Store practices; and, the Congressional Hearing on Big Tech last month demonstrated reservations about Apple’s App Store conduct.</p>



<p><a href="//498F33F7-5FDE-4C32-BBEC-5088817ADF6B#_ftnref1">[1]</a> After being removed from Apple’s App Store, Epic Games was then removed from the Google Play Store, which serves devices operating Google’s Android OS.&nbsp; Epic Games is also seeking an injunction against Google; however, Fortnite can still be downloaded on Android devices from sources that are outside the Google Play Store.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Recent Antitrust Changes To Motion Picture Industry]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/recent-antitrust-changes-to-motion-picture-industry/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/recent-antitrust-changes-to-motion-picture-industry/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2020 19:12:32 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>This week, a United States District Court approved the Department of Justice’s move to terminate the consent decrees (known as the Paramount Decrees) entered into by the government and major movie production and distribution companies nearly 70 years ago. In 1938, the Department of Justice brought an antitrust action against several companies involved in the&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>This week, a United States District Court approved the Department of Justice’s move to terminate the consent decrees (known as the <em>Paramount </em>Decrees) entered into by the government and major movie production and distribution companies nearly 70 years ago.</p>



<p>In 1938, the Department of Justice brought an antitrust action against several companies involved in the production and distribution of motion pictures—including <em>Paramount</em>, after which the decrees are named—alleging that their conduct of led to monopoly power in the distribution market for first-run motion pictures and conspiracies to fix licensing practices, including admission prices, run categories, and “clearances” for substantially all theaters located in the United States.</p>



<p>The consent decrees aimed at preventing film producers and distributors from using their positions to engage in anticompetitive conduct such as granting exclusive licenses based on geography or by tying multiple films into one theatrical license.&nbsp; The DOJ announced their decision terminate the <em>Paramount</em>Decrees in November 2019.</p>



<p>Despite the fact that the DOJ prevailed, it was not without a fight.&nbsp; The Independent Cinema Alliance (“ICA”) and the National Association of Theater Owners (“NATO”) opposed the DOJ’s efforts to eliminate the <em>Paramount </em>Decrees.&nbsp;&nbsp; Among the issues they had with eliminating the consent decree, they argued why restrictions on “block booking” and “circuit dealing” should not be lifted.</p>



<p>Block booking refers to the practice of tying films into one theatrical license, ensuring that a distributor gets multiple movies of its own shown at a theater.&nbsp; This mattered more when cinemas had only one-screen, and the practice could effectively block other distributors from having the opportunity to distribute their movies to a particular cinema.</p>



<p>Circuit dealing refers to a distributor’s practice of licensing films to movie theaters under common ownership all at once, rather than licensing on a theater-by-theater basis.</p>



<p>According to the government, the industry has undergone substantial transformation in the intervening 70 years to warrant termination of the <em>Paramount </em>Decrees.&nbsp; &nbsp;Among the changes:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Today’s films are mostly released in single theater runs; second and third run theaters do not have any appreciable presence in today’s market;</li>



<li>Television broadcasts, streaming services, and DVDs have all made film distributors less reliant on theater distribution;</li>



<li>Some of the largest players in the distribution space are not parties to the original consent decrees;</li>



<li>Changes in antitrust law will protect the type of anticompetitive harm the DOJ initially sought to avoid; for example, the HSR Act requires parties in significant mergers to notify and permit the federal government to investigate any proposed merger.</li>
</ul>



<p>Based on comments received from the public, the DOJ plans to add a sunset period of two years to the <em>Paramount </em>decrees’ block booking and circuit dealing provisions so that they may stay in place for a short period while the rest of the consent decrees are eliminated.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Latest Constitutional Challenge to Section 232 Duties]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/latest-constitutional-challenge-to-section-232-duties/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/latest-constitutional-challenge-to-section-232-duties/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2020 14:29:31 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Beginning in March 2018, President Trump issued proclamations imposing duties on steel and aluminum imports into the United States.&nbsp; In response, one company filed a complaint last week alleging that the administration of these duties is unconstitutional.&nbsp; Thyssenkrupp Materials, NA, Inc. and several of its related operating divisions, filed a complaint with the Court of&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Beginning in March 2018, President Trump issued proclamations imposing duties on steel and aluminum imports into the United States.&nbsp; In response, one company filed a complaint last week alleging that the administration of these duties is unconstitutional.&nbsp; Thyssenkrupp Materials, NA, Inc. and several of its related operating divisions, filed a complaint with the Court of International Trade (CIT) last week seeking to challenge the Section 232 duties.</p>



<p>The complaint alleges improper administration of the exclusion request process.&nbsp; The Presidential Proclamations imposing the Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports indicated that the Department of Commerce be permitted to “exclude from any adopted import restrictions” certain steel and aluminum “articles.”&nbsp;&nbsp; However, the final rules promulgated by the Commerce Department approve exclusions only to the “individual or organization that submitted the request” and that “[o]ther individuals or organizations that wish to submit an exclusion request for steel or aluminum product that has already been the subject of an approved exclusion request may request an exclusion under this supplement.”</p>



<p>As a result, the complaint alleges that the Commerce Department has unfairly and arbitrarily granted exclusions of steel and aluminum products to some requesters, yet the same products imported by a different party may have to pay the duties on items subject to Section 232. &nbsp;&nbsp;Thyssenkrupp lists 27 non-exhaustive subheadings under which it has imported since the Section 232 duties went into effect. &nbsp;While Thyssenkrupp paid duties on these imports, the complaint alleges that other companies had the benefit of having their products under the same subheadings excluded from the duties.</p>



<p>The complaint alleges that this unfair treatment is a violation of Uniformity Clause of the Constitution which states “. . . all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States . . . .”&nbsp; The complaint further seeks relief on grounds that Section 232 is an unconstitutional delegation of authority from Congress to the Executive Branch, that the exclusion process is arbitrary and capricious.</p>



<p>This lawsuit is among many over the years challenging the validity of Section 232.&nbsp; <a href="https://www.antitrustlawyerblog.com/cit-decision-on-constitutionality-of-section-232/">Last year</a>, for example, the CIT ruled that Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was properly delegated from Congress to the Executive Branch.</p>



<p>If you need advice about the Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum, please contact Camelia Mazard at <a href="mailto:cmazard@dbmlawgroup.com">cmazard@dbmlawgroup.com</a> or (202)589-1837.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[DOJ Files Statement of Interest in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations of Mattresses from Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Serbia, Thailand, Turkey and Vietnam]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/doj-files-statement-of-interest-in-anti-dumping-and-countervailing-duty-investigations-of-mattresses-from-cambodia-china-indonesia-malaysia-serbia-thailand-turkey-and-vietnam/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/doj-files-statement-of-interest-in-anti-dumping-and-countervailing-duty-investigations-of-mattresses-from-cambodia-china-indonesia-malaysia-serbia-thailand-turkey-and-vietnam/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2020 17:59:50 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On March 31, 2020, a group of U.S. Mattress producers filed an antidumping (“AD”) and countervailing duty (“CVD”) petition against mattresses from Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Serbia, Thailand, and Vietnam.&nbsp; During the preliminary investigation, the International Trade Commission (the “Commission”) is tasked with evaluating the competitive effects of the imports to determine whether the imports&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>On March 31, 2020, a group of U.S. Mattress producers filed an antidumping (“AD”) and countervailing duty (“CVD”) petition against mattresses from Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Serbia, Thailand, and Vietnam.&nbsp; During the preliminary investigation, the International Trade Commission (the “Commission”) is tasked with evaluating the competitive effects of the imports to determine whether the imports cause material injury to the domestic market.&nbsp; Upon its finding, the Commission may make a preliminary decision to impose duties until it makes a final determination.</p>



<p>The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed a Statement of Interest in the matter requesting that the Commission take into account the effects of COVID-19 on the domestic market and whether the imposition of duties on mattress imports are in the best interests of U.S. consumers.&nbsp; In particular, the DOJ cited to the increase in demand for mattresses in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, and that such demand “will continue to increase significantly during the pandemic as communities around the country expand hospital capacity.”</p>



<p>Given the backdrop of the global pandemic, and the fact that “demand may outpace domestic supply”, DOJ wants to ensure that the imposition of dumping margins, ranging from 48% to more than 1000%, do not increase mattress prices nor affect the supply of mattresses needed around the country.</p>



<p>The mere fear of additional duties could deter American companies from importing sorely needed mattresses to address supply shortages. &nbsp;&nbsp;First, preliminary duties—though they can be refunded if a final determination lowers the duty rates—can lead to price increases and supply disruption in the short term.&nbsp; Second, the risk that duties may be imposed retroactively can deter American companies from importing mattresses to fill supply shortages.</p>



<p>The DOJ letter echoes our firm’s position about this poorly-timed petition.&nbsp; U.S. importers and foreign producers are worried about the effects of duties on the American response to COVID-19, particularly with the ability of hospitals to source mattresses in response to an influx of new patients.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Antitrust Scrutiny of Agreements Not to Compete For Employees]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/antitrust-scrutiny-of-agreements-not-to-compete-for-employees/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/antitrust-scrutiny-of-agreements-not-to-compete-for-employees/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sat, 23 Nov 2019 14:20:45 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Civil Non-Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[anti-poach]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[antitrust]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Antitrust Division]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[duke]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[employment]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[no poach]]></category>
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Employers and Human Resource personnel need a crash course in the antitrust laws and an understanding of the antitrust risks of entering into no-poach agreements. What is a no-poach agreement?&nbsp; A no-poach agreement is essentially an agreement between two companies not to compete for each other’s employees, such as by not soliciting or hiring them.&hellip;</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Employers and Human Resource personnel need a crash course in the antitrust laws and an understanding of the antitrust risks of entering into no-poach agreements.</p>



<p><strong><a href="http://www.dcemploymentlawyerblog.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">What is a no-poach agreement?</a>&nbsp;</strong></p>



<p>A no-poach agreement is essentially an agreement between two companies not to compete for each other’s employees, such as by not soliciting or hiring them. No-poach agreements, or agreements not to approach other companies’ employees to hire, are generally considered illegal under the antitrust laws.&nbsp; When companies make agreements not to compete for each other’s employees, they are restraining commerce because they are not allowing working people to freely change jobs to potentially make more money or move to another location if they wish to. It is illegal for companies or other entities to make these agreements, but it happens more often than you would think – just like the case with <em>Seaman v. Duke University</em>.</p>



<p><strong>&nbsp;</strong><strong>What happened in <em>Seaman v. Duke University</em>?</strong></p>



<p>Dr. Seaman is an assistant professor at Duke University’s (Duke) medical school. Duke made an anti-poaching agreement with its competitor, the University of North Carolina (UNC). Dr. Seaman and others, who were faculty at Duke and UNC medical schools, filed a class action lawsuit against Duke claiming that Duke violated the Sherman Act when it entered into the agreement to “prevent lateral hiring of certain medical employees in order to eliminate competition and suppress compensation.” <em>See</em> <em>Seaman v. Duke University and Duke University Health System</em>, Case No. 1:15-cv-000462-CCE-JLW (M.D.N.C.).</p>



<p>In March, the Department of Justice (DOJ) got involved in the case by filing a <a href="https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1141756/download" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Statement of Interest.</a> This allowed the DOJ to intervene to influence and actually enforce an outcome that prevents anti-poaching agreements in the future.</p>



<p>In the end, the parties settled the case. In the settlement agreement, it was decided that Duke would pay Dr. Seaman and faculty members $54,500,000, along with attorney’s fees, reimbursement for costs, and a service award. What is interesting is that the federal district court in North Carolina presiding over the case went a step further and allowed the DOJ to enforce the injunctive relief provisions of the settlement agreement. The injunctive relief provisions of the settlement agreement prohibit Duke from entering into any anti-poaching agreements for five years and require Duke to take steps to ensure this does not happen in the future. Such steps include enacting notification and compliance policies within the University.</p>



<p><strong>Lessons Learned:</strong></p>



<p>The DOJ continues to scrutinize no poaching agreements.&nbsp; Given the DOJ’s focus on no poach agreements, it has become increasingly important for employers in all industries to learn about the risks of entering into agreements that limit their competition for employees.&nbsp; In its ability to enforce these provisions, the DOJ will be keeping a close eye on Duke, while simultaneously using Duke as an example to other companies and entities. The DOJ’s goal is to be proactive in enforcing antitrust laws that prohibit these kinds of agreements between employers and <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-comments-settlement-private-no-poach-class-action-allows-government" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">to protect the American worker</a>.&nbsp; The courts and the DOJ are sending clear signals to employers that they are cracking down on anti-poaching agreements.&nbsp; It is important for employers to make sure they are not making employment contracts that break the law.&nbsp; Employers need to take anti-poaching agreements seriously.&nbsp; It is time for employers to sort through and re-examine contracts and make sure they are legal.</p>



<p><strong>Andre Barlow</strong><br>(202) 589-1838<br><a href="mailto:abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</a></p>
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC Sues to Block Chemical Merger]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-sues-to-block-chemical-merger/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-sues-to-block-chemical-merger/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 05 Aug 2019 01:06:47 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[antitrust]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[chemical]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[coordinated effects]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[evonik]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[merger]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[peroxychem]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[unilateral effects]]></category>
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On August 2, 2019, the FTC authorized an enforcement action to challenge Evonik Industries AG’s (“Evonik”) proposed $625 million acquisition of PeroxyChem Holding Company (“PeroxyChem”). Complaint The FTC is alleging the merger of the chemical companies would substantially reduce competition in the Pacific Northwest and the Southern and Central United States for the production and&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>On August 2, 2019, the FTC authorized an enforcement action to challenge Evonik Industries AG’s (“Evonik”) proposed $625 million acquisition of PeroxyChem Holding Company (“PeroxyChem”).</p>



<p><strong>Complaint</strong></p>



<p>The FTC is alleging the merger of the chemical companies would substantially reduce competition in the Pacific Northwest and the Southern and Central United States for the production and sale of hydrogen peroxide, a commodity chemical used for oxidation, disinfection, and bleaching.</p>



<p>Most hydrogen peroxide produced in North America is sold to pulp and paper customers for bleaching pulp and de-inking recycled paper, according to the complaint.&nbsp; Hydrogen peroxide is also used to sterilize food and beverage packaging, and in chemical synthesis, fracking, water treatment, and electronics.&nbsp; For most end uses, there are no effective substitutes, the complaint alleges.&nbsp; Because of high transportation costs, customers prefer nearby suppliers.</p>



<p>The complaint alleges that the acquisition would harm competition in at least two ways.&nbsp; First, it would increase the likelihood of coordination in a market&nbsp; that already functions as an oligopoly and has a long history of price-fixing including guilty pleas and litigation settlements.&nbsp; &nbsp;The markets are highly concentrated, with significant transparency among rival firms, and long-term, stable customer-supplier relationships, low elasticity of demand, and a history of strong interdependent behavior, the complaint states.&nbsp; Evonik has high market shares of approximately 50% in both geographic markets.&nbsp; Second, the acquisition would eliminate significant head-to-head competition between Evonik and PeroxyChem in the Pacific Northwest, where it would leave only one other hydrogen peroxide producer, and in the Southern and Central United States, where it would leave three other producers.&nbsp; The complaint alleges that customers have benefitted from competition between Evonik and PeroxyChem in the form of lower prices.</p>



<p>New competitors or expansion by existing firms is unlikely to be timely or sufficient to offset anticompetitive harm, due to the massive investment necessary to build a new hydrogen peroxide plant.</p>



<p>The FTC vote to issue the administrative complaint and file the agreed-upon request for a temporary restraining order in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia was 4-0-1.&nbsp; Chairman Joseph J. Simons was recused.&nbsp; The administrative trial is scheduled to begin on January 22, 2020.</p>



<p><strong>Lessons Learned</strong></p>



<p>The FTC’s challenge of the merger is demonstrates that the FTC will take action to preserve competition and protect consumers when the facts support a lawsuit.&nbsp; The FTC action shows that&nbsp; firms that propose a merger or acquisition in a concentrated industry with a history of past collusion should expect increased scrutiny. As the FTC noted in its Complaint, evidence of past collusion is important to the FTC’s coordinated effects analysis. Merging parties should be prepared to show that market conditions have changed since the past collusion has occurred. Here, the parties were not able to do that and the FTC alleged that the market is vulnerable to coordination.&nbsp; Besides relying on a coordinated effects theory, the FTC alleges that the merger eliminates head to head competition, which will likely lead to higher prices.</p>



<p><strong>Andre Barlow</strong><br>(202) 589-1838<br><a href="mailto:abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</a></p>
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                <title><![CDATA[USTR Will Open an Online Portal for Section 301 List 3 Exclusion Process]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ustr-will-open-an-online-portal-for-section-301-list-3-exclusion-process/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ustr-will-open-an-online-portal-for-section-301-list-3-exclusion-process/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jul 2019 18:47:39 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On June 20, 2019 the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) announced an exclusion process for tariffs imposed on September 2018 (“List 3”) pursuant to the U.S. Section 301 action against China. This announcement was followed by a notice published in the Federal Register. Through this exclusion process, parties will be able to&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>On June 20, 2019 the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) announced an exclusion process for tariffs imposed on September 2018 (“List 3”) pursuant to the U.S. Section 301 action against China. This announcement was followed by a <a href="https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/Procedures_for_Requests_to_Exclude_Particular_Products_from_the_September_2018_Action.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">notice</a> published in the Federal Register. Through this exclusion process, parties will be able to request that USTR exclude specific products from the twenty-five percent tariff currently scheduled to apply to List 3 products under the Harmonized Schedule. While exclusion rounds for Lists 1 and 2 are closed, the exclusion process for List 3 products will begin on June 30, 2019 and will be administered through an electronic portal available at&nbsp; <a href="https://exclusions.ustr.gov/s/login/?startURL=%2Fs%2F&ec=302" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://exclusions.ustr.gov</a> (portal will open on June 30, 2019). <a href="https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/Procedures_for_Requests_to_Exclude_Particular_Products_from_the_September_2018_Action.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Copies of the exclusion forms</a> are currently available online so interested parties can begin reviewing the necessary forms.</p>



<p><strong>Background on Section 301 Tariffs</strong></p>



<p>A Section 301 investigation, conducted by USTR, revealed that numerous unreasonable or discriminatory Chinese laws and practices relating to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation are adversely affecting U.S. businesses. The <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2018/june/section-301-investigation-fact-sheet" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">investigation found that</a>:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>The Chinese government’s use of joint ventures and foreign investment restrictions (among other practices) routinely pressure U.S. companies to transfer their technology to Chinese companies;</li>



<li>The Chinese government has practices in place to make it difficult for U.S. businesses to set market terms in licensing matters and in technology-related negotiations;</li>



<li>The Chinese government regularly authorizes and supports cyber intrusions into U.S. commercial networks to gain business information otherwise not publicly available; and</li>



<li>The Chinese government unfairly facilitates systematic investment in U.S. companies to gain access to new technology.</li>
</ul>



<p>USTR believes that the U.S. <a href="https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2018/june/section-301-investigation-fact-sheet" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">incurs damages of $50 billion a year</a> as a result of these unfair and discriminatory practices.</p>



<p>As a result of the investigation, on September 17, 2018 USTR announced that the United States will impose an additional ten percent tariff on imports from China. These tariffs went into effect on September 26, 2018 and were supposed to increase to twenty-five percent on January 1, 2019, but the tariff increase was delayed due to U.S. negotiations with China. When negotiations with China stalled, President Trump announced on May 9, 2019 that List 3 tariffs will increase to twenty-five percent.</p>



<p>Parties interested in applying for exclusion for their products would be wise to address USTR’s investigation findings when completing their exclusion form paperwork. Successfully parties in the exclusion process will likely need to demonstrate how receiving an exclusion will not exacerbate the concerns USTR mentioned in its investigation report.</p>



<p><strong>Applying for Exclusion</strong></p>



<p>Interested parties may begin submitting exclusion requests beginning on <em>June 30, 2019 at 12:00 pm EDT</em> and the deadline for exclusion requests will be <em>September 30, 2019</em>. In its submission, a party should include descriptive information about its product and should provide supporting data and the rationale for the requested exclusion. The asserted rationale is of significant importance because USTR will evaluate each product on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the exclusion of the product will undermine the objectives of the Section 301 investigation. USTR also wants to ensure that products excluded from tariffs are narrowly defined to prevent exclusions from being overly broad. Interested parties need to submit a separate exclusion request for each product; however, one product may contain one or more goods with similar characteristics. Any exclusion will be effective starting from September 24, 2018 and will extend for one year after USTR publishes the exclusion determination.</p>



<p><strong>Responses to Exclusion Requests and Replies </strong></p>



<p>After a request for exclusion is posted on the USTR website, interested parties will have fourteen days to respond to the request- either in support of or opposition to exclusion. Responses, like exclusion requests, will be publicly available for others to read. After a response is posted on the USTR website any interested party will have seven days after the close of the response or seven days after the posting of the response (whichever is longer) to reply to the response. Replies will also be publicly available for others to read.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Additional Tariffs on Mexican Imports: A “Creative” Approach to Both Immigration Policy and Negotiation Strategy that Will Likely Have Widespread Consequences]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/additional-tariffs-on-mexican-imports-a-creative-approach-to-both-immigration-policy-and-negotiation-strategy-that-will-likely-have-widespread-consequences/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/additional-tariffs-on-mexican-imports-a-creative-approach-to-both-immigration-policy-and-negotiation-strategy-that-will-likely-have-widespread-consequences/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 10 Jun 2019 18:25:19 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On May 30, 2019 President Trump announced via Twitter that the United States (U.S.) will impose tariffs on Mexican imports to prompt Mexico to significantly reduce immigration to the U.S.&nbsp; President Trump will impose these additional tariffs in the context of rapidly increasing immigration from Mexico to the U.S. over the past months. In declaring&hellip;</p>
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<p>On May 30, 2019 President Trump announced via Twitter that the United States (U.S.) will impose tariffs on Mexican imports to prompt Mexico to significantly reduce immigration to the U.S.&nbsp; President Trump will impose these additional tariffs in the context of rapidly increasing immigration from Mexico to the U.S. over the past months.</p>



<p><a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-authority-behind-trumps-new-tariffs-mexico" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">In declaring these new tariffs</a>, President Trump relied on powers that Congress delegated to the president under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977.&nbsp; &nbsp;Congress enacted this statute to provide the president with the necessary authority to restrict transactions between U.S. persons and foreign entities located outside the U.S. that pose threats to U.S. national security interests.&nbsp; Therefore, the president typically invokes IEEPA in sanctions matters (e.g. the Iranian, Syrian, and North Korean sanctions programs) and export control matters (e.g. regulations regarding transferring control of sensitive technology and information from a U.S. person to a foreign person).</p>



<p>The absence of language in IEEPA referring to “tariffs” or “immigration” combined with the stark contrast between this current invocation and past invocations of IEEPA have lead <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/use-of-emergency-declaration-to-impose-tariffs-on-mexico-is-legally-questionable-scholars-say/2019/06/04/f9b60004-86ed-11e9-a870-b9c411dc4312_story.html?utm_term=.fc03701a0135" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">some scholars</a> to believe that the use of this statute for imposing additional tariffs on Mexican imports may be illegal. &nbsp;Members of President Trump’s own political party have expressed similar beliefs. <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/31/trump-says-us-will-impose-5percent-tariff-on-all-mexican-imports-from-june-10.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">For instance,</a> Chuck Grassley, a Republican senator on the U.S. Finance Committee, has publically supported this view by saying that President Trump has exceeded his authority.</p>



<p>Regardless of whether the new tariffs on Mexican imports are legal, a five percent tariff will go into effect on Monday, June 10, 2019 on approximately <em>$350 billion</em> worth of Mexican imports. &nbsp;Currently the U.S. and Mexican governments are in negotiations touching on immigration issues, but discussions do not appear immensely successful at this time. U.S. threats to increase tariffs on Mexican imports is certainly part of its negotiation strategy. &nbsp;Mexico has stated that it will not be coerced into making immigration changes because of the U.S. threats, but President Trump likely hopes that Mexico may be more amenable to U.S. suggestions regarding immigration when faced with additional tariffs on Mexican imports.&nbsp; However, if President Trump remains dissatisfied with Mexico’s commitment to and progress towards limiting immigration; negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico fail; and if a challenger fails to prove that President Trump acted outside of IEEPA’s delegation of power, tariffs on Mexican imports will likely increase by five percent each month until they reach twenty-five percent in October 2019. &nbsp;The question of whether the tariff increases on Mexican imports will go into effect is present at negotiations between the U.S. and Mexico and will likely have an effect on the outcome of talks regardless of whether additional tariffs are imposed.</p>



<p>The new tariffs on Mexican imports will affect many U.S. consumers that rely on Mexican imports for everyday items. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/business/economy/mexico-tariffs-state-by-state.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">These Mexican imports</a> subject to additional tariffs include automobiles (autos), auto parts, crude oil, and produce, to name a few.</p>



<p>With regards to autos, according to the Center on Auto Research, approximately forty percent of auto parts within the U.S. come from Mexico. Additionally, due to integrated North American supply chains, smaller auto parts are often incorporated into larger parts that travel across North American borders multiple times before finally becoming incorporated into a vehicle. &nbsp;As a result, an auto part will likely be subject to these new tariffs on Mexican imports numerous times during the car production process. The additional tariffs on parts that typically across borders numerous times will make cars more expensive to produce and these additional costs will result <a href="https://www.npr.org/2019/06/03/729191900/how-would-planned-tariffs-against-mexico-affect-u-s-auto-industry" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">in higher prices for consumers</a>.&nbsp; <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-04/toyota-warns-u-s-dealers-of-negative-impact-from-mexico-tariff" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Toyota predicts</a> that additional tariffs on Mexican imports will increase the cost of auto parts for its top selling model, the midsized Tacoma, by approximately one billion dollars. These additional tariffs will also <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tariffs-on-mexico-ford-would-do-significant-damage/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">greatly affect Ford,</a> an American multinational car company headquartered in Michigan, because seventeen percent of its cars are manufactured in Mexico.</p>



<p>The additional tariffs will also have detrimental impacts on smaller goods, like avocados and plastic products.&nbsp; Currently a shortage of avocados from Mexico has resulted in U.S. consumers paying higher prices. These new tariffs, however, will likely cause the price of Mexican avocados within the U.S. to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-03/mexico-avocado-price-rises-3-7-to-highest-since-august-2017" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">dramatically increase</a> even further than current prices, which are already at a record high.&nbsp; Additionally, the U.S. imports approximately $7 billion of plastic and plastic goods per year and U.S. consumers will likely notice increases in prices relating to plastic goods.&nbsp; In short, U.S. consumers of large and small goods <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-does-the-us-import-from-mexico-a-whole-lot/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">will likely be affected</a> by these new tariffs on Mexican imports.</p>



<p>Persons inside the U.S. will also likely notice the effects of additional tariffs on Mexican imports at the gas pump and while traveling.&nbsp; &nbsp;Mexico is the U.S.’s second largest foreign source <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/04/investing/oil-mexico-tariffs-refineries/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">of oil</a> and supplies oil to major gasoline distributors, like Exxon and Valero. &nbsp;These additional tariffs will also increase travel costs for many U.S. persons because heavy oil that oil refineries need to produce jet fuel often comes from Mexico due to sanctions against other large supplies, like Venezuela.</p>



<p>Additional tariffs on Mexican imports will likely have a negative effect on the economy.&nbsp; Some have predicted that these recent tariffs and their associated rising costs will result in the loss of 400,000 American jobs (specifically in manufacturing and retail), <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/05/business/mexico-tariffs-job-losses/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">significant rises</a> in costs of goods, and even another recession. &nbsp;Although economists are unable to predict the exact consequences of these additional tariffs on Mexican imports, these additional tariffs will likely have a strong negative impact on the U.S. economy if they fail to serve as a successful part of U.S. negotiations regarding immigration of persons from Mexico.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Trump Administration Lifts Tariffs on Imports of Steel and Aluminum from Canada and Mexico]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/trump-administration-lifts-tariffs-on-imports-of-steel-and-aluminum-from-canada-and-mexico/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/trump-administration-lifts-tariffs-on-imports-of-steel-and-aluminum-from-canada-and-mexico/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2019 21:01:10 GMT</pubDate>
                
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                <description><![CDATA[<p>President Trump announced an agreement to remove the tariffs imposed on steel and aluminum imports from Canada and Mexico as part of the renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).&nbsp; The current tariffs included a 25 percent rate on steel imports and 10 percent on aluminum imports. In response to the United States’ steel and&hellip;</p>
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<p>President Trump announced an agreement to remove the tariffs imposed on steel and aluminum imports from Canada and Mexico as part of the renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).&nbsp; The current tariffs included a 25 percent rate on steel imports and 10 percent on aluminum imports. In response to the United States’ steel and aluminum tariffs, Mexico and Canada launched their own retaliatory tariffs on a wide range of products, including pork, whiskey, and orange juice.</p>



<p>The Trump Administration imposed the tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allows the President to impose restrictions on certain imports if the Department of Commerce finds that such imports “threaten or impair national security.”&nbsp;Section 232 gives the Executive wide latitude to make such determinations, and such decisions need not receive Congressional approval.&nbsp; Indeed, such broad authority caused Congress to debate the merits of Section 232 determinations, and a recent bill was introduced in the Senate to remove the national security determinations <a href="https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ContentRecord_id=D8788F15-227E-453E-848B-7F7C45D0D3B7" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">from the Department of Commerce to the Department of Defense. Such efforts have stalled.</a></p>



<p>According to a statement from the United States Trade Representative, the countries will focus on monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to prevent surges of imports of steel and aluminum. &nbsp;<a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2019/05/joint-statement-by-the-united-states-and-canada-on-section-232-duties-on-steel-and-aluminum.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">A joint statement from the US and Canada </a>indicated that both countries will strive to prevent transshipment from third countries, such as China, and otherwise prevent the importation of products that are unfairly subsidized or sold at dumped prices.</p>



<p>The removal of tariffs was the largest hurdle to Congressional approval of a renegotiated NAFTA–now called the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”).&nbsp;Now, Congress must approve the deal, although some House Democrats expressed concern over the USMCA’s protections concerning labor, environment, and prescription drugs.</p>



<p>Such efforts from the Trump Administration are a slight respite from the overall trade war. &nbsp;For example, the Administration recently <a href="https://www.antitrustlawyerblog.com/updates-in-international-trade/">increased pressure on China</a>, going as far as raising tariffs on $200 billion worth of goods to 25 percent, prompting China to retaliate&nbsp;by imposing higher tariffs on US imports.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[China Retaliates Against U.S. Tariffs]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/china-retaliates-against-u-s-tariffs/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/china-retaliates-against-u-s-tariffs/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 13 May 2019 17:44:44 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Last week, the Trump Administration raised tariffs to 25% on $200 billion worth of goods that previously were subject to 10% tariffs.&nbsp; The increased rate in tariffs were brought on as a result of accusations that the Chinese delegation to the trade negotiations back-tracked on previous agreements, and the increase was meant to ratchet up&hellip;</p>
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<p><a href="https://www.antitrustlawyerblog.com/updates-in-international-trade/">Last week</a>, the Trump Administration raised tariffs to 25% on $200 billion worth of goods that previously were subject to 10% tariffs.&nbsp; The increased rate in tariffs were brought on as a result of accusations that the Chinese delegation to the trade negotiations back-tracked on previous agreements, and the increase was meant to ratchet up pressure on China to make a deal.</p>



<p>This week, China retaliated by raising tariffs on $60 billion of U.S. goods.&nbsp; The goods targeted already were subject to some tariffs.&nbsp; Now 5,140 tariff lines will be subject to an increased rate, including 2,493 cotton, machinery and grain products that are going to be subject to a 25% tariff from a previous 10% tariff rate; and 1,078 products, including aircraft parts, optical instruments and certain types of furniture that will be subject to a 20% tariff rate from a previous 10% tariff rate; and 974 products, including corn flour and wine, will have a 10% tariff rate – up from 5%.</p>



<p>In response to the retaliatory tariffs from China, President Trump tweeted: “. . . China should not retaliate-will only get worse!”&nbsp; The proposed rates will take effect on June 1.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Updates in International Trade]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/updates-in-international-trade/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/updates-in-international-trade/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2019 20:59:51 GMT</pubDate>
                
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                <description><![CDATA[<p>The last few weeks brought a flurry of developments regarding international trade.&nbsp; Two petitions recently were filed with the US International Trade Commission (“ITC”). On April 30th, Hirsh Industries filed an antidumping (“AD”) and countervailing duty (“CVD”) petition on imports of certain vertical metal file cabinets from China.&nbsp; The petition covers metal filing cabinets containing&hellip;</p>
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<p>The last few weeks brought a flurry of developments regarding international trade.&nbsp; Two petitions recently were filed with the US International Trade Commission (“ITC”).</p>



<p>On April 30<sup>th</sup>, Hirsh Industries filed an antidumping (“AD”) and countervailing duty (“CVD”) petition on imports of certain vertical metal file cabinets from China.&nbsp; The petition covers metal filing cabinets containing extendable file storage elements having a width of 25 inches or less and having a height greater than its width.&nbsp; The petition alleges dumping margins of 120.48 percent and 196.79 percent. The Department of Commerce will decide whether to initiate its investigation on May 20, 2019.</p>



<p>On May 8, Cambria Company LLC filed AD/CVD petitions on imports of certain quartz surface products from India and the Republic of Turkey.&nbsp; The scope of the investigation is fairly broad, and includes quartz surface products such as slabs, including tabletops, countertops, bar tops, vanity tops, tabletops, tiles, etc. The petitioner alleges a 344.11 percent dumping margin against India, and an 89.38 percent dumping margin against the Republic of Turkey. &nbsp;The Department of Commerce will decide whether to initiate its investigation on May 28, 2019.</p>



<p>In addition to these petitions, President Trump ratcheted pressure on China in trade negotiations.&nbsp; The pressure came as a result of accusations that China back-tracked on previous agreements made during the negotiations.&nbsp; President Trump indicated that his Administration would raise tariffs this Friday, May 10, on $200 billion worth of goods to 25 percent from the current 10 percent rate.&nbsp; He also threatened to impose a new round of tariffs on $325 billion of additional Chinese goods.</p>



<p>The Federal Register notice implementing the tariff increase indicates that USTR shall institute a process that allows parties to request exclusion of specific products affected by the tariff increases.&nbsp; American businesses are caught between challenging the tariffs, paying higher prices to import the goods, or reconsidering their current supply chain in order to avoid hefty costs.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[USTR Announces Second Round of Tariff Exclusions]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ustr-announces-second-round-of-tariff-exclusions/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ustr-announces-second-round-of-tariff-exclusions/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2019 14:36:57 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>When USTR announced tariffs on imports from China on July 6, 2018, it also announced the procedures and deadlines for seeking exclusions from such duties. Late last month, USTR announced that it would grant exclusions from tariffs for a second set of Chinese imports (“List 2”).&nbsp; The second round of exclusions cover about 87 separate&hellip;</p>
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<p>When USTR announced tariffs on imports from China on July 6, 2018, it also announced the procedures and deadlines for seeking exclusions from such duties. Late last month, USTR announced that it would grant exclusions from tariffs for a second set of Chinese imports (“List 2”).&nbsp; The second round of exclusions cover about 87 separate exclusion requests.</p>



<p>All persons could submit requests for exclusion of a particular product, why the exclusion was sought, along with other information such as the quantity and value of the Chinese-origin product.&nbsp; The USTR then weighed several factors in determining whether to grant the exclusions, including: whether the product was only available in China, whether severe economic harm would result from the duties, and whether the products are important to Chinese industry.</p>



<p>The tariff exclusions from List 2 included about 87 exclusion requests, spanning three ten-digit HTS categories and thirty other product categories.&nbsp; The exclusions will be dated retroactively to the date when USTR announced the tariffs, July 6, 2018.&nbsp; Fortunately, any importer can take advantage of the relevant exclusion even if it was not the one that applied to the exclusion.</p>



<p>A third set of tariffs was imposed for products (“List 3”) on September 24, 2018 and, originally, was not intended to have a process for requesting exclusions.&nbsp; Congress passed a law to ensure that that USTR provided an opportunity to request an exclusion, and USTR was to have crafted an exclusion request process no later than March 17, 2019. To date, USTR has not provided an exclusion request process for tariffs on products on List 3, presumably because they are waiting on the outcome of the US-China trade talks.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[CIT Decision on Constitutionality of Section 232]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/cit-decision-on-constitutionality-of-section-232/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/cit-decision-on-constitutionality-of-section-232/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2019 14:36:29 GMT</pubDate>
                
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                <description><![CDATA[<p>A lawsuit commenced by the American Institute for International Steel (“AIIS”) regarding the constitutionality of Section 232 before the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) has been decided.&nbsp; A three-judge panel decided that Section 232 was not unconstitutional. The plaintiffs argued that Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, did not properly&hellip;</p>
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<p>A lawsuit commenced by the American Institute for International Steel (“AIIS”) regarding the constitutionality of Section 232 before the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) has been decided.&nbsp; A three-judge panel decided that Section 232 was not unconstitutional.</p>



<p>The plaintiffs argued that Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, did not properly delegate authority to the Executive Branch because there is no “intelligible principle” under which Section 232 authorizes presidential action.</p>



<p>CIT determined that Section 232 did, in fact, meet the “intelligible principle” standard to uphold Section 232’s constitutionality.&nbsp; In reaching its decision, the CIT relied on a 1976 case, <em>Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG Inc.</em>, 426 U.S. 548 (1976), where the Supreme Court upheld a similar challenge against Section 232, finding that Section 232 “establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action. . . .”</p>



<p>Plaintiffs attempted to distinguish the 1976 case from the one before it, but ultimately failed to convince the three-judge panel that the <em>Algonquin</em>was not binding on the CIT.</p>



<p>Despite the outcome, there are avenues for appeal.&nbsp; The case can be appealed to the Supreme Court, where the Highest Court can revisit its earlier rulings and revise the law.&nbsp; Despite the difficulty in overruling an earlier Supreme Court decision, one judge on the CIT panel expressed “grave doubts” about the 1976 decision that was binding on the CIT.&nbsp; Judge Katzmann did not dissent from the opinion, and maintained that he was bound by earlier precedent, but maintained skepticism that the earlier decision was right.&nbsp; Judge Katzmann expressed concern that Section 232 violates the spirit of Separation of Powers embedded in the Constitution because it:</p>



<p>“provides virtually unbridled discretion to the President with respect to the power over trade that is reserved by the Constitution to Congress. Nor does the statute require congressional approval of any presidential actions that fall within its scope. In short, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the statute has permitted the transfer of power to the President in violation of the separation of powers.”</p>



<p>AIIS already announced its decision to appeal the decision, so time will tell whether the Supreme Court will revisit its earlier precedent.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[DOJ Focuses on Innovation in Thales’ Acquisiton of Gemalto]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/doj-focuses-on-innovation-in-thales-acquisiton-of-gemalto/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/doj-focuses-on-innovation-in-thales-acquisiton-of-gemalto/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Thu, 28 Mar 2019 19:16:00 GMT</pubDate>
                
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                <description><![CDATA[<p>In February 2019, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division required divestitures from Thales in order for the company to proceed with its proposed $5.64 billion acquisition of Gemalto. Why This Merger Mattered Prior to the transaction, Thales and Gemalto were the world’s leading providers of General Purpose Hardware Security Modules (GP HSMs). These devices are&hellip;</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>In February 2019, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division required <strong data-start="263" data-end="291">divestitures from Thales</strong> in order for the company to proceed with its proposed <strong data-start="346" data-end="386">$5.64 billion acquisition of Gemalto</strong>.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-why-this-merger-mattered">Why This Merger Mattered</h3>



<p>Prior to the transaction, <strong data-start="448" data-end="560">Thales and Gemalto were the world’s leading providers of General Purpose Hardware Security Modules (GP HSMs)</strong>. These devices are critical components in complex encryption systems that safeguard sensitive government and corporate data.</p>



<p>Breaking into the GP HSM market is no small task—successful entry demands <strong data-start="763" data-end="828">substantial time, capital investment, and technical expertise</strong> to design and develop products with the same level of <strong data-start="883" data-end="935">functionality, interoperability, and reliability</strong> as established offerings. Competition is therefore crucial, as it drives innovation and ensures that customers benefit from higher-quality, more secure solutions.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-doj-s-remedy">DOJ’s Remedy</h3>



<p>To address these concerns, the DOJ required <strong data-start="1165" data-end="1205">Thales to divest its GP HSM business</strong>, including intellectual property and research capabilities. This remedy was designed to ensure that competitors could continue to innovate and bring advanced data security solutions to market without delay.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-key-takeaway">Key Takeaway</h3>



<p>The Thales/Gemalto case illustrates a broader principle:<br data-start="1491" data-end="1494">👉 <strong data-start="1497" data-end="1596">The Antitrust Division closely examines mergers for their impact on innovation, not just price.</strong></p>



<p>In markets where security, reliability, and cutting-edge technology are critical, preserving competition means safeguarding the pace of innovation itself.</p>



<p>Andre Barlow</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Trump Administration Acts to Lower Medicare Prescription Drug Prices]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/trump-administration-acts-to-lower-medicare-prescription-drug-prices/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/trump-administration-acts-to-lower-medicare-prescription-drug-prices/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2019 18:30:41 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
                
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                    <category><![CDATA[biosimilars]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[drug prices]]></category>
                
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                    <category><![CDATA[medicare]]></category>
                
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                <description><![CDATA[<p>The rising prices of existing and new brand prescription drugs could have serious consequences for tax payers and the 44 million seniors who rely on Medicare.&nbsp; In order to rein in those costs, it’s vital for the Administration to encourage the use of generic drugs and biosimilars. While Congress has been grabbing the headlines by&hellip;</p>
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                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>The rising prices of existing and new brand prescription drugs could have serious consequences for tax payers and the 44 million seniors who rely on Medicare.&nbsp; In order to rein in those costs, it’s vital for the Administration to encourage the use of generic drugs and biosimilars.</p>



<p>While Congress has been grabbing the headlines by holding numerous hearings and introducing various legislative proposals aimed at lowering drug prices, the Trump Administration has introduced some consumer-friendly changes to Medicare that should change the way drugs are priced for seniors and encourage the use of generics and biosimilars.&nbsp; First, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposes to change how insurance plans and PBMs conduct drug utilization management and structure drug formularies.&nbsp; Second, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) proposes to eliminate the rebates that pharmacy benefit managers (“PBMs”) receive from drug manufacturers and to encourage that any rebates go directly to seniors at the point of sale.</p>



<p>These significant reforms are necessary as the stakes are high.&nbsp; Since 2006, Medicare Part D spending has more than doubled to roughly $100 billion per year in 2017, and it is expected to climb as a growing and aging population of baby boomers becomes Medicare eligible.&nbsp; Today, despite making up a modest proportion of Part D prescriptions, brand drugs account for some 84% of total Part D spending. &nbsp;Generics, meanwhile, which make up most of the Part D prescriptions, account for only 16% of the total spending and saved the Part D program approximately $82 billion in 2017.</p>



<p>Those savings, however, could have been higher.&nbsp; The formulary construction and contracting practices of both PBMs and Part D plans have cost seniors billions of dollars. &nbsp;Part D plans have a lot of flexibility to design drug formularies and tier structure. &nbsp;Historically, generics were placed in lower generic tiers and brands were placed in higher brand tiers.&nbsp; This meant that seniors’ copays for generics were less than those for branded drugs so their out-of-pocket costs were lower when they purchased generic drugs. &nbsp;Over time, Part D plans started to place generics in higher brand tiers.&nbsp; And, in 2016, CMS announced a change to the formulary structure that explicitly allowed Part D plans to create a non-preferred tier, with higher copays, that could include both brands and generics.</p>



<p>The CMS change emboldened Part D plans to place generics and brands in the higher tier. &nbsp;As a result, seniors have been faced with higher “branded” copays and out-of-pocket costs for generic drugs.&nbsp; Indeed, recent studies from Avalere estimate that since 2015, seniors have paid nearly $22 billion in additional out-of-pocket costs for their prescription drugs, and seniors are paying approximately $1,000 more in out-of-pocket costs per year than they should be.</p>



<p>The change to formulary structure is costly enough, but matters become worse when PBM and plan incentives are considered.&nbsp; Because of misaligned incentives that exist in the drug supply chain, PBMs and Part D plans seek out rebates based off escalating list prices of brand drugs.&nbsp; Instead of offering seniors the best quality medicines at affordable prices, they are incentivized to implement plans designed to steer seniors from lower cost generics to branded drugs by comingling them on the same drug formulary tier.</p>



<p>The Administration’s proposal (1) to reverse CMS’s Part D formulary guidelines that allowed the practice of comingling generics on brand tiers and (2) to require plans to automatically include generic and biosimilar medicines on generic formulary tiers immediately after launch is a great first step in lowering drug prices for seniors. &nbsp;According to HHS, besides raising seniors’ out-of-pocket costs, in 2017, this practice led to the federal government unnecessarily spending $9 billion on brand-name drugs that have a generic alternative.&nbsp; HHS claims that if these prescriptions were dispensed as generics, the Medicare program would have saved $3 billion.&nbsp; Moreover, implementing&nbsp;the current CMS proposal is estimated to save seniors approximately $4 billion in out-of-pocket costs per year.</p>



<p>The Administration’s proposal to eliminate rebates is also critical to lowering the cost of drugs for seniors.&nbsp; The PBM market is not competitive: it lacks transparency and choice, while conflicts of interest abound.&nbsp; Perversely, rebates create an incentive for PBMs to actually support higher list prices for brand drugs and sales of brand drugs over lower cost generics, which often result in higher copays for seniors.&nbsp; It has been estimated that rebates cost seniors up to 30% more for their drugs.&nbsp; Significantly, rebates have more than doubled in the last five years Indeed, rebates have more than doubled in the last five years and in 2018, pharmaceutical manufacturers paid $166 billion in rebates and price concessions to PBMs, insurers and the supply chain. &nbsp;The PBMs pocket some of the rebates and pass some of the discounts to the Part D plans.&nbsp; Seniors, who are purchasing drugs with high copays, though, do not see any significant benefits from the discounts so encouraging that discounts actually be passed on to them at the pharmacy counter is another major step in the right direction.</p>



<p>Implementing both of the Administration’s proposals is vital to the current and long-term success of the Medicare Part D program as they will have the effect of lowering Part D prices to seniors and the federal government.&nbsp; They will also increase utilization of less expensive generics and biosimilars. &nbsp;Medicare has been largely successful at moderating cost growth where there is generic competition, so regulations that make generics and biosimilars more accessible is critical to ensuring that patients have access to the therapies they need at lower out-of-pocket costs.</p>



<p><strong>Andre Barlow</strong><br>
(202) 589-1838<br>
<a href="mailto:abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</a></p>
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