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        <title><![CDATA[Doyle, Barlow & Mazard]]></title>
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        <description><![CDATA[Doyle, Barlow & Mazard PLLC's Website]]></description>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 19:28:27 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC and Bipartisan State AGs Sue to Block Covetrus’s $3.5 Billion Acquisition of MWI: A Classic Horizontal Challenge Focused on Distribution Middlemen]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-and-bipartisan-state-ags-sue-to-block-covetruss-3-5-billion-acquisition-of-mwi-a-classic-horizontal-challenge-focused-on-distribution-middlemen/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-and-bipartisan-state-ags-sue-to-block-covetruss-3-5-billion-acquisition-of-mwi-a-classic-horizontal-challenge-focused-on-distribution-middlemen/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:14:33 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Antitrust Litigation Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On November 13, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission and attorneys general from 13 states filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to block Covetrus Inc. (and its private-equity owners Clayton, Dubilier & Rice and TPG) from acquiring MWI Veterinary Supply Inc. (MWI Animal Health) from Cencora Inc. for&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On November 13, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission and attorneys general from 13 states filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to block Covetrus Inc. (and its private-equity owners Clayton, Dubilier & Rice and TPG) from acquiring MWI Veterinary Supply Inc. (MWI Animal Health) from Cencora Inc. for approximately $3.5 billion. The Commission authorized the action by a 2-0 vote. The parties have agreed to a temporary restraining order preventing closing before December 4, 2026.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Background</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Covetrus and MWI are the two largest national distributors of veterinary pharmaceuticals, vaccines, surgical supplies, “white goods” (gloves, gauze, syringes), and related products and services to independent veterinary clinics and large corporate practice groups. A third national player, Patterson Veterinary, also operates in the space; the FTC’s theory centers on the two largest firms. The deal was announced around mid-March 2026. As veterinary care costs have risen substantially in recent years, the parties positioned the combination as a way to improve clinic economics, service, and innovation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Facing scrutiny, Covetrus retained Miller Strategies, the government-relations firm founded by Republican lobbyist Jeff Miller, to advocate for the transaction. In October 2026 the parties submitted a formal remedy package to the FTC and state enforcers. Regulators concluded the package was insufficient to protect competition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Complaint: Horizontal Overlap, Narrow Markets, and Elimination of Head-to-Head Competition</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The FTC and the state AGs (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and Texas) allege that the transaction would substantially lessen competition in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The complaint defines two relevant markets: (1) veterinary clinic distribution and (2) distribution to large corporate accounts. In these markets Covetrus and MWI are the two largest suppliers. Their national networks of distribution centers allow rapid delivery and the offering of volume discounts and rebates that smaller or regional rivals cannot match. The combined firm would control more than 50 percent of the relevant markets and create highly concentrated markets that are presumptively unlawful under prevailing case law and the 2023 FTC-DOJ Merger Guidelines.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The core theory is the elimination of intense head-to-head competition. The complaint alleges that Covetrus and MWI have engaged in an “all-out price war.” When MWI pursued aggressive pricing, Covetrus responded by lowering its own prices and expanding rebates through its VetSuite program. This rivalry intensified with the rise of Vetcove, an online platform that lets veterinarians compare prices across distributors and use one firm’s quote against the other in negotiations. Corporate groups routinely play the two companies against each other; independent clinics benefit from the same dynamic. The FTC argues that specialty distributors, manufacturers selling direct, retailers, and other fringe suppliers do not impose a meaningful competitive constraint on the full-line national distributors because of structural barriers to entry and scale advantages in logistics, inventory, and rebate programs.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The predicted effects are higher prices and costs for veterinary clinics, reduced service quality and investment in customer support, and higher prices ultimately borne by pet owners.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Parties’ Antitrust Defense</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Covetrus immediately announced it would fight the case in court. In a November 13 statement the company called the FTC’s approach “a narrow and outdated view of the market.” It argues that veterinary practices today have far more purchasing options than a traditional middleman-distributor analysis captures:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Direct manufacturer sales: Nearly all practices buy some products directly from manufacturers, some of which maintain larger sales forces than the distributors themselves.</li>



<li>Other national and regional distributors.</li>



<li>Online veterinary marketplaces used by more than 60 percent of U.S. practices, which allow comparison shopping and ordering from 40-plus distributors and thousands of manufacturers in a single cart.</li>



<li>Retailer disintermediation: Retailers sell flea-and-tick treatments, pharmaceuticals, and pet foods directly to pet owners, bypassing both distributors and clinics.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Covetrus contends that clinics routinely multi-source, switch suppliers regularly, and have seen prices pressured downward by this broader competitive set. All suppliers rely on the same parcel carriers (UPS, USPS, FedEx). The company maintains that the merger will improve efficiencies, lower the cost of serving practices, and support innovation and reliability without harming competition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Lessons Learned</strong></p>



<ol start="1" class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>The FTC continues to work closely with bipartisan groups of state attorneys general to protect competition.</strong> The coalition spans red and blue states and reflects coordinated federal-state enforcement on a horizontal deal affecting clinics and pet owners nationwide.</li>



<li><strong>The FTC is willing to rely on a relatively narrow market definition focused on full-line middleman distribution.</strong> It treats national veterinary clinic distributors as the relevant competitive arena and discounts direct manufacturer sales, online comparison platforms, and retail channels as insufficient constraints on the core distribution function that clinics rely upon for rapid, full-line supply and scale rebates.</li>



<li><strong>The FTC still challenges deals it concludes are anticompetitive even after lobbying efforts and a proposed remedy package.</strong> Hiring a well-connected lobbying firm and offering concessions in October did not deter the agency and the states from filing for a permanent injunction once they determined the competitive harm remained.</li>
</ol>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This case will turn on whether courts accept the agencies’ narrow distribution markets and evidence of head-to-head price and service rivalry, or whether they credit the parties’ broader competitive picture of manufacturer direct sales, digital marketplaces, and retail channels. The complaint is a reminder that the FTC is willing to block deals where the evidence tends to show .</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andre Barlow</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC and 17 States Secure $63 Million Settlement with Family Dollar Over Deceptive Shelf Pricing]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-and-17-states-secure-63-million-settlement-with-family-dollar-over-deceptive-shelf-pricing/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-and-17-states-secure-63-million-settlement-with-family-dollar-over-deceptive-shelf-pricing/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 17:14:51 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC Consumer Protection Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On November 12, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission and attorneys general from 17 states announced a $63 million settlement resolving allegations that Family Dollar Stores, LLC routinely charged customers more at the register than the prices displayed on shelves, price tags, advertisements, its website, and its mobile app. The case was filed in the U.S.&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On November 12, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission and attorneys general from 17 states announced a $63 million settlement resolving allegations that Family Dollar Stores, LLC routinely charged customers more at the register than the prices displayed on shelves, price tags, advertisements, its website, and its mobile app. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia alongside a proposed stipulated final order. The Commission authorized the complaint and order by a 2-0 vote.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Allegations</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">According to the complaint, thousands of Family Dollar stores nationwide engaged in widespread pricing discrepancies that cost consumers millions of dollars. The practices were particularly harmful in low-income communities with limited access to full-service grocery stores. State and local regulators had cited the company for thousands of pricing violations over the prior five years, generating more than $3 million in fines. In the three years before the FTC action, Family Dollar had already entered multiple settlements with state attorneys general and consumer-protection agencies, paying more than $800,000 in penalties for inaccurate pricing—yet the overcharges continued.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The complaint further alleges that Family Dollar charged higher prices at the register than those listed on its website and mobile app. Consumers repeatedly reported that they could not redeem “Smart Coupons” discounts because the app failed to function at checkout. Internal company records showed consumer complaints about the same mobile-app problems stretching back six years. Despite thousands of failed regulatory inspections, hundreds of consumer complaints, and repeated enforcement actions, Family Dollar allegedly failed to correct the deceptive pricing practices and continued making false pricing representations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The participating states are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Settlement</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under the proposed order, Family Dollar must:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Establish a $40 million consumer redress fund for eligible purchasers (those who bought items at Family Dollar between January 1, 2023, and October 1, 2026). The company must post clear notices of the fund in stores and on its digital platforms.</li>



<li>Create a $20 million discount program for Family Dollar customers.</li>



<li>Pay more than $3 million to the participating states.</li>



<li>Cease misrepresenting the prices of its goods or services.</li>



<li>Implement a pricing-accuracy program that requires regular monitoring and verification of prices, employee training to identify discrepancies, and prompt correction of errors so that customers are charged the prices advertised or displayed. The program must be independently assessed and annually certified.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Family Dollar did not admit or deny the allegations. The order remains subject to court approval.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Related Enforcement: Dollar General</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Family Dollar settlement follows a related complaint the FTC and 20 states filed on October 26, 2026, against Dollar General Corporation alleging substantially similar deceptive pricing-accuracy practices. That litigation remains ongoing.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Takeaways</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The action underscores the FTC’s and states’ continued focus on price transparency at the point of sale, especially for retailers serving lower-income consumers. Persistent shelf-to-register discrepancies—documented through consumer complaints, failed inspections, prior settlements, and internal records—can support claims under the FTC Act and parallel state consumer-protection statutes. The settlement’s combination of monetary redress, a forward-looking discount program, and a monitored pricing-accuracy program with independent assessment illustrates the relief enforcers are seeking in these cases. Retailers that rely on high volumes of low-priced goods should treat shelf, tag, circular, website, and app pricing accuracy as a core compliance priority, particularly where prior regulatory warnings or settlements exist.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andre Barlow</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC and Bipartisan States Force Abandonment of PlayPower’s Acquisition of BCI Burke]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-and-bipartisan-states-force-abandonment-of-playpowers-acquisition-of-bci-burke/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-and-bipartisan-states-force-abandonment-of-playpowers-acquisition-of-bci-burke/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 16:18:00 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On October 19, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission and a bipartisan coalition of 12 state attorneys general sued in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to block Platinum Equity and its portfolio company PlayPower from acquiring BCI Burke, one of PlayPower’s closest competitors in commercial outdoor playground equipment. Just eight days&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On October 19, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission and a bipartisan coalition of 12 state attorneys general sued in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to block Platinum Equity and its portfolio company PlayPower from acquiring BCI Burke, one of PlayPower’s closest competitors in commercial outdoor playground equipment. Just eight days later, on October 27, the parties abandoned the deal. The rapid outcome underscores the continued potency of coordinated federal-state horizontal merger challenges, even when the parties retain prominent lobbying support.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Background and the Challenge</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">PlayPower, acquired by Platinum Equity in 2025, already controlled multiple commercial playground brands, including Miracle Recreation, Little Tikes Commercial, and Playworld Systems—acquired in prior transactions. BCI Burke, owned by Bertram Capital, was a leading independent competitor, particularly strong in smaller and medium-sized projects for schools, parks, churches, and municipalities. The top five manufacturers (including PlayPower and Burke) controlled roughly 85% to 90% of the U.S. market for commercial outdoor playground equipment. The proposed deal would have reduced the number of major competitors from five to four and given the combined firm more than 30% of the market.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The FTC, joined by the attorneys general of Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin, alleged that the transaction violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act. The complaint focused on a national market for commercial outdoor playground equipment. It alleged that PlayPower and Burke were intense head-to-head rivals that competed on price, quality, safety, innovation, and service. Customers—especially public entities spending hundreds of millions of dollars annually—benefited from that rivalry. The agencies argued that the merger would eliminate this direct competition, raise prices, reduce quality and innovation, and leave smaller or niche manufacturers unable to constrain the combined firm because of barriers involving distribution, sales forces, safety certifications, manufacturing capacity, and product breadth.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Commission voted 2-0 to authorize the permanent-injunction action. The case was part of a broader pattern in which PlayPower had previously acquired rivals rather than outcompete them.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Lobbying Efforts and Their Failure</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In an effort to secure regulatory approval, PlayPower retained Miller Strategies, the Washington, D.C. government-relations firm founded by Jeff Miller, to lobby on antitrust and related issues. Lobbying disclosures show the firm registered for the company and reported substantial fees in 2026 for work on labor, antitrust, and workplace matters. Despite those efforts, the FTC and the bipartisan state coalition proceeded with the lawsuit. The parties later cited the time and expense of protracted litigation as reasons for abandoning the transaction.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Termination and Agency Reaction</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On October 26–27, 2026, PlayPower and BCI Burke mutually terminated their merger agreement. In a statement, PlayPower’s CEO maintained that the companies would have prevailed on the merits, arguing the FTC and states misunderstood a fragmented and globally competitive market and that the combined firm would have held less than 30% share. The companies emphasized continued focus on their separate businesses.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">FTC Bureau of Competition Director Daniel Guarnera called the abandonment “a win for American consumers” that would help keep prices lower for schools, churches, daycares, and parks departments. He noted that taxpayers are major beneficiaries of continued head-to-head competition and that children and families would benefit from higher quality, better service, and greater innovation. He thanked FTC staff and the state partners, and stated that the agency would continue to protect consumers from deals that raise prices, reduce quality, or lessen innovation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Lessons</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This case illustrates several recurring features of current merger enforcement. First, the FTC continues to partner with bipartisan groups of state attorneys general on horizontal deals that affect public purchasers and everyday consumers. Second, the agency is prepared to challenge combinations of close rivals in already concentrated markets—even when the parties argue the market is broader or more fragmented and even after they retain well-connected lobbyists. Third, when the agencies assemble a strong evidentiary record of head-to-head competition and structural concentration (here, top-five control of 85–90% and a post-merger share exceeding 30%), the prospect of a full trial can be sufficient to cause the parties to abandon the deal rather than litigate. For private-equity-backed serial acquirers in concentrated manufacturing or equipment markets serving public customers, the PlayPower-Burke episode is a clear reminder that lobbying and efficiency or “complementary brand” arguments may not overcome documented rivalry and high concentration under the current guidelines and enforcement posture.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andre Barlow</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC Wins Permanent Injunction Blocking Henkel’s Acquisition of Liquid Nails]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-wins-permanent-injunction-blocking-henkels-acquisition-of-liquid-nails/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-wins-permanent-injunction-blocking-henkels-acquisition-of-liquid-nails/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 16:01:00 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On August 14, 2026, after a seven-day trial, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the Federal Trade Commission’s request for a permanent injunction blocking Henkel AG & Co. KGaA’s proposed $725 million acquisition of the Liquid Nails brand from private-equity firm American Industrial Partners. The ruling permanently prevents the&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On August 14, 2026, after a seven-day trial, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the Federal Trade Commission’s request for a permanent injunction blocking Henkel AG & Co. KGaA’s proposed $725 million acquisition of the Liquid Nails brand from private-equity firm American Industrial Partners. The ruling permanently prevents the combination of the two leading construction-adhesive brands sold at major U.S. retailers and marks a successful use of the FTC’s approach of seeking a permanent injunction directly in federal court.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Transaction and Competitive Concerns</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Henkel manufactures the industry-leading Loctite brand of construction adhesives. Liquid Nails is its principal rival. Under the proposed deal, announced in April 2025, Henkel would have acquired Liquid Nails from American Industrial Partners for $725 million. The FTC alleged that the two brands are the clear top sellers of construction adhesives at retailers such as The Home Depot, Lowe’s, and Ace Hardware, and that each has long viewed the other as its primary competitor.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The FTC filed its complaint in the Southern District of New York on December 11, 2025, seeking a permanent injunction. The agency argued that the merger would eliminate fierce head-to-head competition between Loctite and Liquid Nails, resulting in higher prices, lower quality, and reduced innovation for a product widely used by do-it-yourself consumers and professional contractors to build and maintain homes. The complaint further alleged that the combination would significantly increase concentration in the relevant market and produce a highly concentrated market presumed unlawful under existing antitrust case law and the FTC and Department of Justice’s joint merger guidelines. The Commission vote to authorize the challenge was 2-0.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Court Decision and Agency Statement</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Following the seven-day bench trial, the district court sided with the FTC and issued a permanent injunction. Bureau of Competition Director Daniel Guarnera stated that “anyone who looked at the construction adhesives shelves of a hardware store or home improvement retailer could see that a merger between Loctite and Liquid Nails would be a bad deal for Americans.” He noted that the acquisition threatened to drive up the cost of a critical product for building and maintaining homes and that the court’s decision will ensure Americans continue to benefit from competition between the two brands, including lower prices and higher quality.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The FTC described the result as reflecting its newer practice of seeking permanent injunctions to block anticompetitive mergers in federal court without the need to continue parallel administrative proceedings. The outcome therefore both resolved the substantive competition concerns and validated the procedural approach.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Implications</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Henkel-Liquid Nails case illustrates the FTC’s willingness to challenge horizontal combinations of close rivals in concentrated retail consumer-product markets, particularly where the products affect the cost of housing construction and home improvement. Evidence that the parties are the clear top two brands, that they compete directly on price, quality, and innovation, and that they dominate shelf space at major retailers proved sufficient for the court to block the deal permanently. For companies evaluating acquisitions of leading branded rivals in consumer categories, the result underscores that strong head-to-head competition evidence can support a successful challenge, and that the FTC may pursue a challenge in federal district court. The permanent injunction keeps Loctite and Liquid Nails under separate ownership, preserving the competition the agency argued has benefited American consumers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andre Barlow</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC Deadlock Clears IonQ’s Acquisition of SkyWater Without Remedy]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-deadlock-clears-ionqs-acquisition-of-skywater-without-remedy/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-deadlock-clears-ionqs-acquisition-of-skywater-without-remedy/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2026 16:21:00 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On July 28, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission granted early termination of its Hart-Scott-Rodino review of IonQ Inc.’s approximately $1.8 billion acquisition of SkyWater Technology, Inc. The decision allowed the deal to close without conditions or a consent order. The outcome was not a unanimous determination that the transaction raised no competitive issues. It was&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On July 28, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission granted early termination of its Hart-Scott-Rodino review of IonQ Inc.’s approximately $1.8 billion acquisition of SkyWater Technology, Inc. The decision allowed the deal to close without conditions or a consent order. The outcome was not a unanimous determination that the transaction raised no competitive issues. It was the product of a 1-1 split between the Commission’s only two sitting members—Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson and Commissioner Mark R. Meador—on whether short-term vertical concerns warranted a behavioral remedy. Both agreed that a full lawsuit to block the merger would have been an imprudent use of agency resources. With no majority for an order and litigation off the table, early termination was the only remaining path.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Transaction and Vertical Concerns</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">IonQ is a developer of quantum computers racing with rivals to achieve the first practical fault-tolerant systems. SkyWater is a U.S.-based semiconductor foundry that fabricates specialized chips and provides development services for quantum-computing companies, including IonQ and several of its competitors. The deal creates a vertically integrated platform combining quantum hardware development with domestic fabrication capacity.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Staff’s investigation identified classic vertical risks: (1) the merged firm’s ability and incentive to delay or withhold SkyWater’s foundry services from IonQ’s rivals (particularly those with ongoing projects, given high switching costs and limited near-term capacity), and (2) IonQ’s potential access to rivals’ competitively sensitive technical information held at SkyWater. These concerns were especially salient in a strategic technology race involving national-security and commercial applications, where the Administration has prioritized U.S. leadership through investments and executive action.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Chairman Ferguson’s Position</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Chairman Ferguson stated that he did not prefer the early-termination outcome. He concluded that the evidence gave him “reason to believe” the vertical merger “may be substantially to lessen competition” in the short term, even while likely producing procompetitive efficiencies and innovation benefits over the longer term as additional domestic foundry capacity comes online. He favored a negotiated behavioral order that would have addressed the short-term risks while preserving the deal’s longer-term advantages. That order reportedly included non-discrimination commitments, information firewalls, switching assistance for affected customers, monitoring, and prior-notice provisions for future foundry acquisitions. He viewed an outright challenge as overkill because it would have blocked both the short-term risks and the benefits of vertical integration. In the absence of a majority for the order, he concluded the Commission should “get out of the way and permit the merger to close so that the likely benefits for competition and innovation may swiftly be realized.”</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Commissioner Meador’s Position</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Commissioner Meador reached the opposite conclusion on the merits. He found the available evidence insufficient to demonstrate that the transaction “may be substantially to lessen competition,” and instead viewed it as procompetitive or competitively neutral. He identified four principal reasons: (1) any hypothetical foreclosure share fell well below the 50% threshold the 2023 Merger Guidelines treat as presumptively substantial, and below the 30–40% levels courts have typically required in exclusive-dealing cases; (2) SkyWater was not a “must-have” input, given the diversity of quantum hardware modalities, alternative foundries, and national-laboratory capacity; (3) the foreclosure risk was decidedly short-term; and (4) substantial federal investment under the current Administration is expanding the domestic quantum ecosystem and reducing structural dependencies. He therefore could not support what he characterized as regulatory intervention into a dynamic innovation market.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Implications</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The IonQ-SkyWater clearance illustrates the practical consequences of a two-commissioner FTC. A majority is required to issue a complaint or accept a consent order. When the two members disagree on whether the facts support a reason to believe that competition may be substantially lessened—and both view full litigation as imprudent—the transaction proceeds without remedy. The case also provides a detailed public window into how the current Commissioners approach vertical mergers involving specialized inputs in strategic technologies. Ferguson was prepared to use behavioral relief to manage short-term foreclosure and information risks while preserving longer-term efficiencies and national-policy benefits. Meador applied a higher evidentiary threshold focused on foreclosure share, the existence of alternatives, the temporal scope of the concern, and the broader competitive and policy environment. Both rejected ideological hostility to vertical integration and agreed that an outright block was unwarranted. For parties contemplating vertical combinations in concentrated or strategic input markets, the statements underscore that close factual questions can produce different outcomes under the same record, and that a split Commission can clear a deal that one member would have conditioned.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andre Barlow</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[USITC Enters New Leadership Era with Doyle as Chairman]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/usitc-enters-new-leadership-era-with-doyle-as-chairman/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/usitc-enters-new-leadership-era-with-doyle-as-chairman/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2026 15:06:33 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>A change in the leadership of the U.S. International Trade Commission is now underway. Following the Senate’s confirmation of five nominees on July 16, 2026, Brett Doyle has been selected to lead the agency as its new Chairman. Doyle’s appointment to the leadership position came shortly after he formally joined the Commission. He took office&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A change in the leadership of the U.S. International Trade Commission is now underway. Following the Senate’s confirmation of five nominees on July 16, 2026, Brett Doyle has been selected to lead the agency as its new Chairman.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Doyle’s appointment to the leadership position came shortly after he formally joined the Commission. He took office as a commissioner on July 17, one day after receiving Senate confirmation, and President Donald J. Trump selected him as Chairman on July 20. His chairmanship is scheduled to continue until June 16, 2028, while his service as a commissioner is set to run through December 16, 2030.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The change also concludes a brief period of interim leadership. David S. Johanson had been performing the duties of Chairman under the Commission’s succession rules after Amy A. Karpel’s term in that role ended on June 16, 2026.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Five Confirmations Reshape the Commission</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Doyle was one of five USITC nominees approved by the Senate on July 16. The Senate also confirmed David Foley, Jr., Samuel Negatu, Peter-Anthony Pappas, and Bartholomew Thanhauser.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The group of confirmations represents an unusually broad change in the makeup of the six-member Commission. As the newly confirmed members take office, the agency is positioned to return to full membership with a substantially different group of commissioners than it had only weeks earlier.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Doyle will therefore begin his tenure as Chairman while the Commission is simultaneously integrating several new members. The appointment places him at the center of an institutional transition rather than a routine change in leadership.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Background in Trade and Government Relations</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Doyle arrives at the Commission after serving as Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Congressional Affairs. His responsibilities in that position included managing USTR’s interactions with Congress on trade negotiations, proposed legislation, tariffs, and enforcement issues.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">His career has also included government service at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and in the U.S. Senate. Outside the federal government, Doyle worked in senior government-relations positions at Sylvamo and the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">He attended Lafayette College and the U.S. Naval War College.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Doyle’s professional background combines trade policy experience with congressional and government-affairs work. That experience will provide the backdrop for his leadership of a Commission whose membership has been almost entirely reconstituted.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The coming months will offer the first indication of how the new group of commissioners approaches its work collectively and how Doyle manages the administrative responsibilities of the chairmanship during the transition.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Senate Confirms Five USITC Commissioners]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/senate-confirms-five-usitc-commissioners/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/senate-confirms-five-usitc-commissioners/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 19:03:23 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[International Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[international trade]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[ITC]]></category>
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On July 16, 2026, the U.S. Senate confirmed five nominees to serve on the U.S. International Trade Commission: Brett Doyle, David Foley, Jr., Samuel Negatu, Peter-Anthony Pappas, and Bartholomew Thanhauser. Once sworn in, the commissioners will restore the USITC to its full six-member complement and substantially reshape the Commission’s membership. The Senate confirmed: The confirmations&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>On July 16, 2026, the U.S. Senate confirmed five nominees to serve on the U.S. International Trade Commission: Brett Doyle, David Foley, Jr., Samuel Negatu, Peter-Anthony Pappas, and Bartholomew Thanhauser.</p>



<p>Once sworn in, the commissioners will restore the USITC to its full six-member complement and substantially reshape the Commission’s membership.</p>



<p>The Senate confirmed:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Brett Doyle</strong>, a Republican from Connecticut, for a term expiring December 16, 2030;</li>



<li><strong>David Foley, Jr.</strong>, a Republican from Virginia, for a term expiring June 16, 2032;</li>



<li><strong>Samuel Negatu</strong>, a Democrat from the District of Columbia, for a term expiring June 16, 2029;</li>



<li><strong>Peter-Anthony Pappas</strong>, a Republican from New Jersey, for a term expiring June 16, 2035; and</li>



<li><strong>Bartholomew Thanhauser</strong>, a Democrat from New York, for a term expiring December 16, 2027.</li>
</ul>



<p>The confirmations followed a June 25 hearing before the Senate Finance Committee and the Committee’s approval of all five nominations on July 14.</p>



<p><strong>A Broad Range of Experience</strong></p>



<p>The confirmed commissioners bring experience spanning intellectual property law, international economic policy, national security, government contracting, and trade negotiations.</p>



<p>Pappas has experience in intellectual property and Section 337 matters, while Thanhauser previously worked on trade policy at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Foley is an attorney and U.S. Air Force Reserve officer, and Doyle and Negatu have held roles involving public policy and international economic matters.</p>



<p>Together, their backgrounds reflect several areas that regularly intersect with the Commission’s work, including intellectual property enforcement, trade policy, technology, and U.S. industrial competitiveness.</p>



<p><strong>Why the Confirmations Matter</strong></p>



<p>The confirmation of five commissioners at once represents a substantial change in the Commission’s membership. The USITC is authorized to have six commissioners, with no more than three belonging to the same political party.</p>



<p>For practitioners, the significance of the transition will become clearer through the commissioners’ early votes and written views. Parties will be watching how the newly composed Commission approaches recurring issues in material injury analyses, including causation, cumulation, conditions of competition, and the treatment of post-petition data. In Section 337 matters, attention will also focus on the Commission’s approach to domestic industry requirements, remedies, and public-interest considerations.</p>



<p>The commissioners’ separate and dissenting views may be particularly useful in identifying areas of consensus and differences in analytical approach.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC Requires Divestitures to Clear Aurobindo’s Acquisition of Lannett, Reinforcing Longstanding Pharma Merger Policy]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-requires-divestitures-to-clear-aurobindos-acquisition-of-lannett-reinforcing-longstanding-pharma-merger-policy/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-requires-divestitures-to-clear-aurobindos-acquisition-of-lannett-reinforcing-longstanding-pharma-merger-policy/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sat, 20 Jun 2026 16:23:00 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On June 18, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint and accepted a proposed consent order requiring Aurobindo Pharma Limited to divest four generic drug products as a condition of completing its approximately $250 million acquisition of Lannett Company, Inc. The action continues the agency’s longstanding approach in pharmaceutical mergers: when a transaction eliminates&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On June 18, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint and accepted a proposed consent order requiring Aurobindo Pharma Limited to divest four generic drug products as a condition of completing its approximately $250 million acquisition of Lannett Company, Inc. The action continues the agency’s longstanding approach in pharmaceutical mergers: when a transaction eliminates head-to-head competition between significant suppliers of particular generic drugs, the FTC routinely requires structural divestitures of the overlapping products to an independent, capable buyer. The 2-0 Commission vote and the structure of the remedy reinforce that this policy remains fully intact.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Transaction and Competitive Concerns</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Aurobindo is one of the world’s largest generic pharmaceutical suppliers. Lannett is a long-established U.S. generics manufacturer. The parties compete in multiple product markets. The FTC’s investigation focused on four generic products for which the companies are among only a limited number of independent significant competitors:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Mycophenolate mofetil oral suspension, an immunosuppressant used to help prevent organ-transplant rejection.</li>



<li>Niacin extended-release tablets, used to manage cholesterol levels and treat niacin deficiency.</li>



<li>Pilocarpine tablets, used to treat dry mouth, including after radiation therapy for head and neck cancer or in patients with Sjögren’s syndrome.</li>



<li>Rabeprazole sodium delayed-release tablets, a proton-pump inhibitor indicated for duodenal ulcers, gastroesophageal reflux disease, and Zollinger-Ellison syndrome.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The complaint alleged that the acquisition would eliminate direct competition between Aurobindo and Lannett in these markets, reducing the number of independent significant competitors. Without a remedy, the deal would increase the likelihood that the combined firm could unilaterally exercise market power and that remaining competitors could engage in coordinated interaction, ultimately forcing customers to pay higher prices for these generic drugs.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Remedy</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under the proposed consent order, Aurobindo and Lannett must divest all rights and assets related to the four products—including FDA approvals, intellectual property, manufacturing know-how, and related assets—to Quagen Pharmaceuticals LLC, an experienced generic pharmaceutical company. The divestitures must occur no later than ten days after the acquisition closes. The parties are also required to provide transition services so that Quagen can operate the assets effectively from the outset and are subject to a monitor to oversee compliance. An Order to Maintain Assets requires the respondents to continue operating the products in the ordinary course until the divestitures are completed. If Quagen is later found unacceptable, the order provides for an alternative divestiture to a Commission-approved buyer.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bureau of Competition Director Daniel Guarnera stated that the action protects millions of patients from the threat of higher generic drug prices and reflects the FTC’s commitment to lowering drug costs for Americans.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Continuity of Policy</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This outcome is consistent with decades of FTC practice in the generics sector. The agency has repeatedly required divestitures of overlapping products in pharmaceutical mergers precisely because generic markets are often concentrated, price competition is sensitive to the number of suppliers, and barriers to entry (including FDA approval and manufacturing capacity) can be significant. Structural remedies that transfer the overlapping products to a viable independent competitor have been the preferred means of restoring the pre-merger competitive dynamic while allowing the remainder of a transaction to proceed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Aurobindo-Lannett consent order follows that template: an early identification of the limited overlaps, negotiation of a structural fix with an experienced upfront buyer, and a 2-0 Commission vote accepting the settlement for public comment. It demonstrates that the current Commission continues to prioritize the preservation of competition in markets for essential generic medicines and remains willing to condition clearance on targeted divestitures when those concerns are substantiated. For parties contemplating generics combinations, the case reaffirms that modest but meaningful product overlaps will still draw scrutiny and that a well-structured, pre-negotiated divestiture package remains the most reliable path to clearance.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andre Barlow</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC Requires Divestitures of Ambulatory Surgery Centers to Clear Ascension’s $3.9 Billion Acquisition of AmSurg]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-requires-divestitures-of-ambulatory-surgery-centers-to-clear-ascensions-3-9-billion-acquisition-of-amsurg/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-requires-divestitures-of-ambulatory-surgery-centers-to-clear-ascensions-3-9-billion-acquisition-of-amsurg/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 16:25:00 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On June 2, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint and accepted a proposed consent order requiring Ascension Health Alliance to divest seven ambulatory surgery centers as a condition of completing its approximately $3.9 billion acquisition of AmSurg LLC. The Commission later finalized the order on August 25, 2026, after a public comment period,&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On June 2, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint and accepted a proposed consent order requiring Ascension Health Alliance to divest seven ambulatory surgery centers as a condition of completing its approximately $3.9 billion acquisition of AmSurg LLC. The Commission later finalized the order on August 25, 2026, after a public comment period, by a 2-0 vote. The remedy preserves competition for certain outpatient surgical services in five metropolitan areas and continues the FTC’s practice of using targeted structural divestitures to resolve local overlaps in healthcare provider mergers.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Transaction and Competitive Concerns</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Ascension is a national nonprofit health system. AmSurg, a subsidiary of Ambulatory Topco LLC, operates more than 250 ambulatory surgery centers across 34 states and provides outpatient surgical services ranging from cataract surgeries to colonoscopies. The proposed combination would have united two significant providers of these services.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The FTC’s investigation identified competitive concerns in the Nashville, Tennessee; Panama City, Florida; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Waco, Texas; and Wichita, Kansas metropolitan areas for certain outpatient procedures performed by gastroenterologists, ophthalmologists, and orthopedists. The complaint alleged that the acquisition would limit competition for these services, increasing the likelihood of higher prices for patients while also threatening quality of care and innovation. The agency worked in collaboration with the offices of the attorneys general of Florida, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Divestiture Remedy</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under the consent order, Ascension must divest seven AmSurg ambulatory surgery centers covering the facilities in the relevant markets where the transaction would otherwise threaten competition. Six of the centers are being divested to SC Affiliates, an experienced national operator of ambulatory surgery centers. The seventh center, in Panama City, is being divested to Florida Gastroenterology Center, a physician group that previously held a minority stake in the facility and will assume full ownership.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The order also requires Ascension, Ambulatory Topco, and AmSurg to provide transition assistance for up to one year, protect confidential information, maintain the viability of the divested assets until transfer, and refrain from interfering with employment relationships at the facilities. An independent monitor will oversee compliance with the divestiture and transition obligations. In addition, for a period of ten years, Ascension must provide the Commission with prior notice of any acquisition of ambulatory surgical centers in the metropolitan areas surrounding the divested facilities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bureau of Competition Director Daniel Guarnera stated that access to quality surgical care at an affordable price is critically important and that the divestitures will help preserve a competitive market so patients can obtain the care they need at a fair price.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Implications</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Ascension-AmSurg resolution illustrates the FTC’s continued focus on local market effects in healthcare provider transactions, even when the overall deal is large and involves a national footprint. By requiring divestiture of the specific facilities that created overlaps in the affected metros, the agency restored the pre-merger competitive dynamic while allowing the remainder of the acquisition to proceed. The inclusion of a ten-year prior-notice obligation further extends oversight in the relevant local markets. For health systems and ambulatory surgery center operators considering combinations, the case reinforces that even modest geographic and service-line overlaps can trigger scrutiny and that a pre-negotiated structural remedy with capable buyers remains a viable path to clearance. The final order, approved after public comment, confirms that this approach continues under the current Commission.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andre Barlow</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC Chairman Ferguson Launches Healthcare Task Force for Coordinated Enforcement and Advocacy]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-chairman-ferguson-launches-healthcare-task-force-for-coordinated-enforcement-and-advocacy/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-chairman-ferguson-launches-healthcare-task-force-for-coordinated-enforcement-and-advocacy/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 16:27:00 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Chairman Ferguson Launches Healthcare Task Force for Coordinated Enforcement and Advocacy On March 20, 2026, Federal Trade Commission Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson directed staff to form a Healthcare Task Force. The initiative is designed to take a coordinated, integrated approach to competition and consumer-protection enforcement and advocacy across the healthcare sector, with the stated goal&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong> Chairman Ferguson Launches Healthcare Task Force for Coordinated Enforcement and Advocacy</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On March 20, 2026, Federal Trade Commission Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson directed staff to form a Healthcare Task Force. The initiative is designed to take a coordinated, integrated approach to competition and consumer-protection enforcement and advocacy across the healthcare sector, with the stated goal of protecting patients, healthcare workers, and taxpayers. It aligns with President Trump’s executive order directing efforts to create a more competitive, innovative, affordable, and higher-quality healthcare system.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Structure and Mandate</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In a memorandum to bureau and office leadership, Chairman Ferguson instructed the Bureaus of Competition, Consumer Protection, and Economics, together with the Office of Policy Planning and the Office of Technology, to establish the Task Force. The group will be co-chaired by one representative each from the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Consumer Protection, with additional members from each bureau and from the Offices of Policy Planning, Technology, and General Counsel. It is expected to meet monthly and report to the Chairman quarterly.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Task Force’s core functions include:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Leading targeted enforcement and advocacy initiatives focused on key priorities;</li>



<li>Developing coordinated, agency-wide strategies for investigations;</li>



<li>Taking a proactive approach to identifying opportunities for amicus briefs and statements of interest; and</li>



<li>Conducting horizon-scanning to identify emerging issues and new priority areas for enforcement and advocacy.</li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Task Force will also seek to expand its membership and collaboration to include other federal partners, notably the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice. Through this structure, the agency intends to share knowledge, market intelligence, case leads, and resources across its dual competition and consumer-protection mandates.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Recent Enforcement Context</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The announcement frames the Task Force as a continuation and institutionalization of the FTC’s recent healthcare work. The agency highlighted several actions from the prior year, including a landmark settlement with Express Scripts requiring practice changes expected to lower patients’ out-of-pocket drug costs (including for insulin) by up to $7 billion over ten years; a successful challenge to Edwards’ proposed acquisition of JenaValve that preserved competition on innovation and product quality; the abandonment of the proposed Alcon-Lensar merger of cataract-surgery device makers, preserving competition on price and innovation; securing $145 million in consumer redress from companies alleged to have misled consumers seeking health insurance; and action against substance-abuse treatment facilities that used deceptive telemarketing practices, yielding $2.4 million in redress.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">These examples illustrate the range of issues—pharmacy-benefit-manager practices, medical-device mergers, consumer deception in insurance and treatment marketing—that the Task Force is intended to address in a more coordinated fashion.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Implications</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">By creating a cross-bureau structure with an explicit interagency component, the Healthcare Task Force signals that healthcare will remain a sustained priority under the current Commission. The emphasis on coordinated investigative strategies, proactive amicus work, and identification of emerging issues suggests both continued scrutiny of traditional competition concerns (such as provider and device mergers) and expanded attention to consumer-protection problems involving pricing transparency, marketing, and data practices. The invitation to partner with HHS and the Department of Justice further indicates that healthcare stakeholders may encounter coordinated federal inquiries that draw on multiple agencies’ authorities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For hospitals, physician groups, pharmacy-benefit managers, device manufacturers, and other industry participants, the formation of the Task Force reinforces the value of early assessment of antitrust and consumer-protection risk and of preparing for a more integrated enforcement posture across the federal government. The initiative institutionalizes the FTC’s dual-mandate approach to healthcare and positions the agency to act more systematically on both existing and emerging issues in the sector.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andre Barlow</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC Forces Abandonment of Alcon’s Acquisition of LENSAR, Preserving Competition in Cataract Laser Systems]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-forces-abandonment-of-alcons-acquisition-of-lensar-preserving-competition-in-cataract-laser-systems/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-forces-abandonment-of-alcons-acquisition-of-lensar-preserving-competition-in-cataract-laser-systems/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sat, 21 Mar 2026 16:30:00 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On March 16, 2026, Alcon, Inc. and LENSAR, Inc. mutually agreed to terminate their merger agreement after the Federal Trade Commission indicated it would seek to block the transaction. The proposed deal, announced in March 2025 and valued at approximately $356 million upfront (with potential milestones bringing the total to roughly $430 million), would have&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On March 16, 2026, Alcon, Inc. and LENSAR, Inc. mutually agreed to terminate their merger agreement after the Federal Trade Commission indicated it would seek to block the transaction. The proposed deal, announced in March 2025 and valued at approximately $356 million upfront (with potential milestones bringing the total to roughly $430 million), would have combined the two most significant competitors in the market for femtosecond laser-assisted cataract surgery (FLACS) systems. The parties abandoned the combination rather than face a full antitrust challenge in court.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Deal and Competitive Concerns</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alcon is a global eye-care company and a leading supplier of cataract-surgery technology, including its LenSx laser system. LENSAR manufactures the ALLY Robotic Cataract Laser Treatment System, along with related software and earlier-generation laser platforms. The FTC’s Bureau of Competition, through its American Competition Enforcement (ACE) Division, concluded that the merger would eliminate the intense head-to-head rivalry between the two firms.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bureau of Competition Director Daniel Guarnera stated that Alcon and LENSAR were “locked in a price war that had already benefited doctors offering FLACS-assisted cataract procedures, as well as their patients,” and that the competition had also driven innovation in the FLACS market. Combining the two most significant players, he said, would have reduced price competition, slowed technological progress, and harmed surgeons and the millions of American patients who undergo cataract procedures. The FTC also noted partnership with the Florida Attorney General’s Office during the investigation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Termination and Company Statements</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Alcon and LENSAR announced the mutual termination on March 16, 2026. Alcon’s CEO, David J. Endicott, said the company continued to believe the acquisition would have enhanced FLACS innovation and competition, but that “the delay and associated costs of this extended regulatory review, which began nearly a year ago, has rendered the transaction unattractive to pursue further in light of the Federal Trade Commission’s opposition.” LENSAR’s CEO, Nick Curtis, expressed disappointment with the FTC’s intention to challenge the deal but affirmed the company’s commitment to advancing its ALLY system. Under the termination agreement, LENSAR retained a $10 million deposit paid by Alcon. The original merger agreement had an outside date of April 23, 2026, with a possible extension to July 23; the parties concluded that necessary U.S. regulatory approvals were unlikely to be obtained in time.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Implications</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The abandonment illustrates the FTC’s willingness to challenge horizontal combinations of close rivals in specialized medical-device markets, particularly where ongoing price competition and innovation rivalry can be documented. Director Guarnera emphasized that competitors “simply cannot attempt to buy out rivals to get out from the heat of pricing and innovation competition” and credited the investigation with producing evidence of consumer harm sufficient to cause the parties to withdraw rather than litigate. The outcome preserves independent competition between Alcon’s and LENSAR’s laser systems for the benefit of surgeons and patients, while also supporting domestic manufacturing activity associated with the products.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For medical-device companies evaluating acquisitions of direct rivals in concentrated segments, the Alcon-LENSAR episode underscores that prolonged regulatory scrutiny, combined with strong evidence of head-to-head competition, can make a transaction untenable even when the parties remain willing to close. The FTC’s public statement frames the result as a successful enforcement action that protects price competition, innovation, and American manufacturing jobs in the FLACS market.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andre Barlow</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC Requires Divestiture of 128 Facilities to Resolve Concerns in Sevita’s Acquisition of BrightSpring’s Community Living Business]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-requires-divestiture-of-128-facilities-to-resolve-concerns-in-sevitas-acquisition-of-brightsprings-community-living-business/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-requires-divestiture-of-128-facilities-to-resolve-concerns-in-sevitas-acquisition-of-brightsprings-community-living-business/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 17:33:00 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On January 30, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint and accepted a proposed consent order requiring Sevita Health to divest 128 intermediate care facilities and related assets as a condition of completing its approximately $835 million acquisition of BrightSpring Health Services, Inc.’s ResCare Community Living business. The Commission finalized the order on June&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On January 30, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint and accepted a proposed consent order requiring Sevita Health to divest 128 intermediate care facilities and related assets as a condition of completing its approximately $835 million acquisition of BrightSpring Health Services, Inc.’s ResCare Community Living business. The Commission finalized the order on June 10, 2026, by a 2-0 vote after a public comment period. The remedy preserves local competition for residential services for individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD) in certain markets in Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas, while allowing the remainder of the transaction to proceed.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Transaction and Competitive Concerns</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Sevita, a subsidiary of Centerbridge Seaport Acquisition Fund, L.P., is a major national provider of home- and community-based services for individuals with IDD. BrightSpring’s ResCare Community Living business is a leading operator of residential and related services in the same space. The proposed combination would have united two of the largest national providers of these services.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The FTC’s complaint alleged that the acquisition would eliminate competition between Sevita and BrightSpring in markets for intermediate care facility (ICF) services for individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities in certain core-based statistical areas in Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas. According to the agency, that competition has been important to ensuring providers compete on quality and choice. A reduction in competition, the complaint stated, would likely diminish incentives to maintain or improve facilities, staffing levels and training, care standards, safety protocols, and individualized services—factors critical for a vulnerable population—and would also reduce families’ ability to select among providers aligned with their needs and preferences. The result, the FTC alleged, would harm the dignity, autonomy, and well-being of individuals with IDD.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Divestiture Remedy</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under the consent order, Sevita must divest 128 ICFs and other assets, such as day-training programs, located in Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas to Dungarvin Group, Inc., an experienced operator of ICFs. The order requires Sevita to assist Dungarvin in obtaining all necessary licenses, permits, authorizations, or certifications; to cooperate in evaluating and offering employment to facility employees for up to one year after the divestiture; and to provide related transition support. For ten years after the order is issued, Sevita must provide advance written notification to the Commission before acquiring any interest in an ICF/IDD facility located in the same core-based statistical area in Indiana, Louisiana, or Texas as any of the divested facilities.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Bureau of Competition Director Daniel Guarnera stated that the action ensures individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities and their families continue to benefit from competition between community living providers, and that the FTC will continue to review acquisitions in healthcare markets to protect quality of care for all Americans, including vulnerable populations.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Implications</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Sevita-BrightSpring resolution demonstrates the FTC’s continued willingness to require structural divestitures in healthcare-services mergers that create local overlaps, even when the overall transaction is large and involves national providers. By identifying specific geographic markets for ICF services and requiring divestiture to a capable independent operator, the agency sought to restore the competitive dynamic that would otherwise have been lost. The ten-year prior-notice obligation further extends oversight in the affected areas. The transaction ultimately closed on March 31, 2026, subject to the consent order.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For providers of residential and community-based services for individuals with IDD, the case underscores that combinations of leading operators can draw scrutiny focused on quality and choice in local markets, and that a targeted divestiture package to an experienced buyer remains a viable means of resolving such concerns while permitting the broader deal to proceed. The finalization of the order after public comment confirms that this approach remains available under the current Commission.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andre Barlow</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[FTC Secures Preliminary Injunction Blocking Edwards Lifesciences’ Acquisition of JenaValve]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-secures-preliminary-injunction-blocking-edwards-lifesciences-acquisition-of-jenavalve/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/ftc-secures-preliminary-injunction-blocking-edwards-lifesciences-acquisition-of-jenavalve/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Sat, 17 Jan 2026 17:35:00 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On January 9, 2026, after a six-day trial, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the Federal Trade Commission’s request for a preliminary injunction temporarily preventing Edwards Lifesciences Corp. from completing its proposed $945 million acquisition of JenaValve Technology, Inc. In response, Edwards announced that it would no longer pursue the acquisition.&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">On January 9, 2026, after a six-day trial, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the Federal Trade Commission’s request for a preliminary injunction temporarily preventing Edwards Lifesciences Corp. from completing its proposed $945 million acquisition of JenaValve Technology, Inc. In response, Edwards announced that it would no longer pursue the acquisition. The outcome halted a transaction that the FTC alleged would have eliminated competition in the U.S. market for transcatheter aortic valve replacement devices used to treat aortic regurgitation (TAVR-AR devices).</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>The Transaction and Competitive Concerns</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Edwards is a major manufacturer of cardiac medical devices. In 2024, it entered agreements to acquire both JenaValve and JC Medical—the two leading companies developing TAVR-AR devices and the only two with ongoing clinical trials in the United States for such products. Edwards completed its acquisition of JC Medical in July 2024. The proposed combination with JenaValve would have brought the only two remaining developers of these devices under common ownership.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The FTC challenged the deal in August 2025, alleging that the acquisition would substantially lessen competition in the U.S. market for TAVR-AR devices. The agency argued that the transaction would reduce innovation, diminish product quality, and potentially increase prices for patients needing treatment for aortic regurgitation, a potentially fatal heart condition. The court accepted a relevant market defined around the research, development, and commercialization of these pre-commercial devices, even though no TAVR-AR product had yet received FDA clearance for commercial sale in the United States.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Court Ruling and Parties’ Responses</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Judge Rudolph Contreras granted the preliminary injunction after the evidentiary hearing. Bureau of Competition Director Daniel Guarnera called the decision “a major victory for the Trump-Vance FTC, American patients, and U.S. healthcare innovation,” stating that it preserves the head-to-head competition between Edwards and JenaValve that has expanded treatment options for patients with potentially fatal heart conditions. He emphasized that Americans benefit when companies compete to create new and lifesaving innovations, and that the FTC will continue to enforce the antitrust laws to protect consumers through lower costs, higher quality, and more innovation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Edwards stated that it disagreed with the court’s decision and believed the acquisition would have been in the best interest of a large and underserved patient population. The company announced it would not proceed with the transaction and revised its full-year 2026 adjusted earnings-per-share guidance upward. The FTC later dismissed its related administrative complaint once the deal was abandoned.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Implications</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Edwards-JenaValve case is notable because it involved products still in clinical development rather than commercially marketed devices. The court’s acceptance of a market for the research, development, and commercialization of TAVR-AR devices confirms that antitrust enforcers can scrutinize combinations of close rivals in the innovation pipeline when those rivals are the only ones pursuing a particular therapy. The preliminary-injunction victory, followed by the parties’ abandonment of the deal, prevented the consolidation of the only two active U.S. clinical-trial programs for these devices.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For medical-device companies evaluating acquisitions of development-stage competitors, the outcome underscores that strong evidence of head-to-head innovation rivalry can support a successful challenge even before products reach the market. The FTC framed the result as protecting competition that drives new treatments for serious conditions, and the case adds to a series of recent healthcare-related enforcement actions under the current Commission.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Andre Barlow</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[CIT Decision on Constitutionality of Section 232]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/cit-decision-on-constitutionality-of-section-232-2/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/cit-decision-on-constitutionality-of-section-232-2/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 23 Sep 2025 14:31:52 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>A lawsuit commenced by the American Institute for International Steel (“AIIS”) regarding the constitutionality of Section 232 before the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) has been decided.&nbsp; A three-judge panel decided that Section 232 was not unconstitutional. The plaintiffs argued that Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, did not properly&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>A lawsuit commenced by the American Institute for International Steel (“AIIS”) regarding the constitutionality of Section 232 before the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) has been decided.&nbsp; A three-judge panel decided that Section 232 was not unconstitutional.</p>



<p>The plaintiffs argued that Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, did not properly delegate authority to the Executive Branch because there is no “intelligible principle” under which Section 232 authorizes presidential action.</p>



<p>CIT determined that Section 232 did, in fact, meet the “intelligible principle” standard to uphold Section 232’s constitutionality.&nbsp; In reaching its decision, the CIT relied on a 1976 case, <em>Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG Inc.</em>, 426 U.S. 548 (1976), where the Supreme Court upheld a similar challenge against Section 232, finding that Section 232 “establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action. . . .”</p>



<p>Plaintiffs attempted to distinguish the 1976 case from the one before it, but ultimately failed to convince the three-judge panel that the <em>Algonquin</em>was not binding on the CIT.</p>



<p>Despite the outcome, there are avenues for appeal.&nbsp; The case can be appealed to the Supreme Court, where the Highest Court can revisit its earlier rulings and revise the law.&nbsp; Despite the difficulty in overruling an earlier Supreme Court decision, one judge on the CIT panel expressed “grave doubts” about the 1976 decision that was binding on the CIT.&nbsp; Judge Katzmann did not dissent from the opinion, and maintained that he was bound by earlier precedent, but maintained skepticism that the earlier decision was right.&nbsp; Judge Katzmann expressed concern that Section 232 violates the spirit of Separation of Powers embedded in the Constitution because it:</p>



<p>“provides virtually unbridled discretion to the President with respect to the power over trade that is reserved by the Constitution to Congress. Nor does the statute require congressional approval of any presidential actions that fall within its scope. In short, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the statute has permitted the transfer of power to the President in violation of the separation of powers.”</p>



<p>AIIS already announced its decision to appeal the decision, so time will tell whether the Supreme Court will revisit its earlier precedent.</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Gail Slater’s 2025 Georgetown Law Speech: Antitrust Remedies Fueling AI Innovation]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/gail-slaters-2025-georgetown-law-speech-antitrust-remedies-fueling-ai-innovation/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/gail-slaters-2025-georgetown-law-speech-antitrust-remedies-fueling-ai-innovation/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2025 20:53:27 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Articles]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[AI innovation]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Antitrust Division]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Antitrust enforcement]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[AT&T breakup]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ Antitrust Division]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[free market competition]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Gail Slater]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Microsoft decree]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[monopolization remedies]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Silicon Valley]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[slater]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[speech]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Standard Oil]]></category>
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>In her keynote address at the 2025 Georgetown Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, Assistant Attorney General Gail Slater, head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, outlined how robust antitrust enforcement can drive innovation in the AI era. Speaking on September 16, 2025, in Washington, D.C., Slater emphasized that free market competition, supported by thoughtful monopolization remedies,&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>In her keynote address at the 2025 Georgetown Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, Assistant Attorney General Gail Slater, head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, outlined how robust antitrust enforcement can drive innovation in the AI era. Speaking on September 16, 2025, in Washington, D.C., Slater emphasized that free market competition, supported by thoughtful monopolization remedies, is key to America’s leadership in the global technological race, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI). Below is a summary of her speech, optimized for SEO with relevant citations.</p>



<p><strong>Key Themes: Antitrust and the Free Market</strong></p>



<p>Slater highlighted the intersection of antitrust remedies and AI innovation, framing the current moment as an “inflection point” for both antitrust enforcement and technology policy. She argued that monopolization remedies should foster competition by opening markets to smaller tech firms while incentivizing large tech companies to innovate rather than exclude competitors. Drawing parallels between the advent of large language models (LLMs) and the internal combustion engine, she stressed that AI’s transformative potential depends on entrepreneurs having the freedom to innovate without monopolistic barriers.</p>



<p></p>



<p>“The antitrust laws are the free market laws,” Slater said, citing the Supreme Court’s ruling in <em>N. Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C.</em> (2015), which underscores antitrust as a safeguard for economic freedom ([1]).</p>



<p><strong>Historical Lessons in Antitrust Enforcement</strong></p>



<p>Slater provided three historical examples to illustrate how antitrust remedies have spurred innovation:</p>



<ol start="1" class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Standard Oil Breakup (1911)</strong>: President Theodore Roosevelt’s lawsuit against Standard Oil dismantled its monopoly, reducing oil prices and enabling industries like automotive and aviation to thrive. This case demonstrated that curbing monopolistic control fosters economic dynamism ([2], [3]).</li>



<li><strong>AT&T Consent Decree (1956)</strong>: The DOJ’s 1949 lawsuit against AT&T led to a settlement that opened access to transistor technology, catalyzing the growth of Silicon Valley firms like Intel and Fairchild. Gordon Moore, Intel’s co-founder, credited this decree for enabling the semiconductor industry’s rise ([4], [5]).</li>



<li><strong>AT&T Breakup (1984)</strong>: Under President Reagan, the DOJ broke up AT&T’s telephone monopoly, fostering competition in long-distance and wireless markets. This enabled innovations like the Carterfone and, later, the iPhone, showing how antitrust remedies can unlock adjacent markets ([6], [8], [10]).</li>



<li><strong>Microsoft Decree (2001)</strong>: The Bush-era settlement with Microsoft prevented the company from stifling competition in the Windows ecosystem, allowing companies like Google and Apple to grow. This case highlighted the importance of protecting “leapfrog competition” for transformative innovations ([11], [12], [13]).</li>
</ol>



<p><strong>Antitrust in the AI Era</strong></p>



<p>Slater emphasized that today’s AI-driven technological race requires similar antitrust vigilance. Monopolists who hoard data, users, or platforms can stifle innovation, much like AT&T and Microsoft did in the past. She advocated for remedies that restructure access to these resources without picking winners, trusting the competitive process to drive growth. This approach, she argued, counters centralized models like China’s, which rely on state-backed monopolies ([1]).</p>



<p><strong>Benefits for All Stakeholders</strong></p>



<p>Slater concluded that antitrust enforcement benefits not only innovators but also monopolists and consumers. Post-breakup, Standard Oil’s successors (ExxonMobil, Chevron) and AT&T’s descendants (Verizon, AT&T) thrived, as did Microsoft after its decree. By fostering competition, antitrust remedies expand economic opportunities, lower prices, and drive innovation, ensuring America’s leadership in AI and beyond ([14], [15]).</p>



<p><strong>Why This Matters for Antitrust and AI</strong></p>



<p>Slater’s speech underscores the DOJ’s commitment to using antitrust enforcement to promote free market competition in the AI era. As LLMs and other AI technologies reshape industries, her insights highlight the need for policies that prevent monopolistic exclusion and empower entrepreneurs. For businesses, policymakers, and tech enthusiasts, her message is clear: robust antitrust remedies are essential for unleashing America’s innovation potential.</p>



<p>Andre Barlow</p>



<p>abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>



<p><em>Citations</em>:</p>



<ol start="1" class="wp-block-list">
<li><em>N. Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C.</em>, 574 U.S. 494 (2015).</li>



<li>Roosevelt, T., <em>Special Message to the Senate and House</em> (1906).</li>



<li><em>Standard Oil Co. v. United States</em>, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).</li>



<li>Watzinger et al., <em>How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation</em> (2020).</li>



<li>Wessner, C.W. (ed.), <em>Capitalizing on New Needs and New Opportunities</em> (2001).</li>



<li>Watzinger & Schnitzer, <em>The Breakup of the Bell System</em> (2022).</li>



<li><em>In re Use of the Carterfone Device</em>, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).</li>



<li>Carstensen, P.C., <em>Remedies for Monopolization</em> (2012).</li>



<li>Heiner, D.A., <em>Microsoft: A Remedial Success?</em> (2012).</li>



<li>Hesse, R.B., <em>Section 2 Remedies and U.S. v. Microsoft</em> (2009).</li>



<li><em>United States v. Microsoft</em>, 253 F.3d 34 (2001).</li>



<li>Comanor, W.S., <em>Break ‘Em Up for Their Own Good</em> (1992).</li>



<li>Id.</li>
</ol>



<p></p>
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                <title><![CDATA[A Slap, Not a Breakup: Judge Mehta’s Google Search Remedies Decision]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/a-slap-not-a-breakup-judge-mehtas-google-remedies-decision/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/a-slap-not-a-breakup-judge-mehtas-google-remedies-decision/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2025 18:07:15 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Antitrust Litigation Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[antitrust]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[apple]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[google]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[slater]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[trump]]></category>
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Introduction The long-awaited remedy phase of United States v. Google concluded on September 2, 2025, when U.S. District Judge Amit P. Mehta delivered a carefully calibrated ruling following his August 2024 finding that Google illegally monopolized search. The decision stops short of breaking up the company yet aims to curtail anti-competitive behavior via behavioral constraints.&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p>



<p>The <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/09/02/google-search-monopoly-antitrust-remedy/?">long-awaited remedy phase of <strong>United States v. Google</strong> concluded on <strong>September 2, 2025</strong>,</a> when U.S. District Judge Amit P. Mehta delivered a carefully calibrated ruling following his August 2024 finding that Google illegally monopolized search. The decision stops short of breaking up the company yet aims to curtail anti-competitive behavior via behavioral constraints.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity" />



<p><strong>Key Remedies Imposed</strong></p>



<p>Despite Google’s resounding defeat last year in the U.S. Department of Justice’s case targeting its search monopoly, Judge Mehta only handed down a mixed bag of remedies aimed at propping up search engine rivals and limiting the exclusive nature of its distribution contracts Judge Mehta’s decision imposes several targeted limitations while allowing Google and its partners like Apple to retain significant benefits:</p>



<ol start="1" class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong><a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-wins-significant-remedies-against-google?">Ban on Exclusive Deals</a></strong><br>GOOGLE may no longer enter or maintain exclusive contracts for distributing Google Search, Chrome, Google Assistant, or the Gemini app. <br>This curtails Google’s ability to lock competitors out through tied default arrangements.</li>



<li><strong><a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-wins-significant-remedies-against-google?">Conditional Revenue-Share Restrictions</a></strong><br>Agreements conditioning revenue-share benefits on distribution or placement of Google’s apps beyond one year are barred.  This means Apple and Google can enter annual contracts and maintain the same relationship.</li>



<li><strong>No Divestiture of Chrome or Android</strong><br>The court rejected calls to mandate a sale of Chrome or Android, finding such remedies too disruptive and poorly tailored to the offending conduct. </li>



<li><strong>Allowed Payments Remain in Place</strong><br>Google can still pay partners for preloading and default placement, avoiding what the court saw as potentially harmful disruptions to the broader ecosystem. </li>



<li><strong><a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-wins-significant-remedies-against-google?">Data Sharing Mandate</a></strong><br>Google must share certain <strong>search index</strong> and <strong>user-interaction</strong> data with “qualified competitors,” though not advertising data. </li>



<li><strong><a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-wins-significant-remedies-against-google?">Syndication Services for Rivals</a></strong><br>Competitors can buy search and text-ads syndication from Google on commercial terms, though scope and duration are narrower than DOJ sought. </li>



<li><strong>No Choice Screens Required</strong><br>The court ruled against mandating user-facing choice screens, citing poor precedent and lack of proven pro-competitive effect. </li>



<li><strong>No Keyword Bidding or Granular Ads Data Required</strong><br>Google won’t be forced to restore exact-match bidding or share granular ad data with advertisers. </li>



<li><strong>T<a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-wins-significant-remedies-against-google?">ransparency in Auctions Required</a></strong><br>Google must publicly disclose material changes to its ad auction systems, enhancing visibility into pricing practices. </li>



<li><strong>Rule-Out of Public Education or Publisher Policy Remedies</strong><br>Proposals such as nationwide campaigns or forced changes to publisher policies were rejected as unrelated to monopolistic acts. </li>



<li><strong>No Anti-Retaliation or Self-Preferencing Clauses</strong><br>The judge found these provisions vague or unsupported in evidentiary record. </li>



<li><strong>Technical Committee and Timeline</strong><br>A six-year remedy term will take effect <strong>60 days</strong> after the final judgment, with a <strong>Technical Committee</strong> appointed immediately to oversee enforcement.</li>
</ol>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity" />



<p><strong>At-a-Glance Table</strong></p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table class="has-fixed-layout"><thead><tr><td><strong>Remedy Type</strong></td><td><strong>Outcome</strong></td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Exclusive distribution</td><td>Banned</td></tr><tr><td>Revenue-sharing conditions</td><td>Restricted beyond 1 year</td></tr><tr><td>Divestiture</td><td>Rejected (Chrome, Android retained)</td></tr><tr><td>Anthros payments</td><td>Permitted</td></tr><tr><td>Data sharing</td><td>Limited to search index and interaction data</td></tr><tr><td>Syndication services</td><td>Allowed on commercial terms with limitations</td></tr><tr><td>Choice screens</td><td>Not required</td></tr><tr><td>Ads data access</td><td>Not required</td></tr><tr><td>Auction transparency</td><td>Required</td></tr><tr><td>Broader remedies</td><td>Replacement campaigns, policy changes, etc.—rejected</td></tr><tr><td>Enforcement structure</td><td>Technical Committee established, 6-year term</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity" />



<p><strong>Analysis</strong></p>



<p><strong>1. “Slap on the Wrist”?</strong></p>



<p>Google avoids structural break-ups and retains flexibility to pay for placement—meaning its dominance in search is likely to persist. </p>



<p><strong>2. But Not Toothless</strong></p>



<p>The restrictions on exclusive contracts and the mandated data sharing add meaningful friction to entrenched practices. These could empower startups and AI-based rivals to gain footholds.</p>



<p><strong>3. Generative AI Changes the Equation</strong></p>



<p>Judge Mehta explicitly noted that the rise of generative AI—such as ChatGPT and Perplexity—factors into the calculus, making overly drastic remedies more dangerous and unnecessary. </p>



<p><strong>4. DOJ and Advocates Push Back</strong></p>



<p>Though the DOJ hailed the ruling as a critical step toward reigniting competition, advocates like <a href="https://www.theverge.com/policy/717087/google-search-remedies-ruling-chrome?">DuckDuckGo CEO Gabriel Weinberg critiqued it as inadequate</a>, warning consumers will still “suffer.” </p>



<p>Meanwhile, <a href="https://www.theverge.com/policy/717087/google-search-remedies-ruling-chrome?">groups like the American Economic Liberties Project lambasted the court’s approach as a failure of enforcement</a>. </p>



<p><strong>5. Echoes of Microsoft Case</strong></p>



<p>The ruling evokes the 2001 Microsoft settlement: no breakup, but behavioral constraints plus a compliance committee. </p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity" />



<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>



<p>Judge Mehta’s remedies against Google represent a measured middle ground — disrupting key anti-competitive behaviors while preserving existing infrastructure. Whether this balance suffices to revive competition in search hinges on how well rivals can leverage access to Google’s data and syndication offerings—and whether antitrust enforcers and Congress step in if results disappoint.</p>



<p>Google and the DOJ may appeal, but the decision allows both sides to claim a victory. It could be years before the remedies take full effect.  And, as an aside, Apple, who benefits from sharing revenue with Google can also claim victory.  </p>



<p></p>



<p>Andre Barlow</p>



<p>abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>



<p>202-589-1838</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Trump’s Revocation of the Biden-Harris Executive Order on Competition: What It Means for Businesses and Mergers]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/trumps-revocation-of-the-biden-harris-executive-order-on-competition-what-it-means-for-businesses-and-mergers/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/trumps-revocation-of-the-biden-harris-executive-order-on-competition-what-it-means-for-businesses-and-mergers/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Fri, 15 Aug 2025 14:48:52 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[FTC Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>On August 13, 2025, President Donald Trump issued an executive order revoking Executive Order 14036, the Biden-Harris administration’s 2021 directive aimed at promoting competition in the American economy. This move signals a shift in federal competition policy, drawing praise from business groups and criticism from consumer advocates. FTC Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson hailed the decision&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>On August 13, 2025, President Donald Trump issued an <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/08/revocation-of-executive-order-on-competition/">executive order revoking Executive Order 14036</a>, the Biden-Harris administration’s 2021 directive aimed at promoting competition in the American economy. This move signals a shift in federal competition policy, drawing praise from business groups and criticism from consumer advocates. <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-revocation-biden-harris-executive-order-competition">FTC Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson</a> hailed the decision as a break from “failed policies,” emphasizing a focus on free markets and innovation. In this blog post, we’ll explore the background of the original order, the details of its revocation, its broader implications, and what businesses—particularly those eyeing mergers—can expect under the new administration.</p>



<p><strong>Background on the 2021 Executive Order</strong></p>



<p><a href="https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/">Executive Order 14036</a>, titled “Promoting Competition in the American Economy,” was signed by President Joe Biden on July 9, 2021. Its core purpose was to launch a “whole-of-government effort” to combat what the administration saw as excessive market concentration and anti-competitive practices that harmed consumers, workers, and small businesses. The order contained 72 specific provisions designed to address these issues across various sectors.</p>



<p>Key goals included:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Strengthening antitrust enforcement to challenge monopolistic behaviors and prior mergers that had consolidated power.</li>



<li>Promoting worker rights by limiting non-compete agreements and enhancing labor market competition.</li>



<li>Supporting consumer access to affordable goods and services, such as over-the-counter hearing aids and broadband “nutrition labels” for transparency.</li>
</ul>



<p>The order directed over a dozen federal agencies to take action. For instance:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) were instructed to vigorously enforce antitrust laws, including reviewing and challenging past mergers in high-concentration sectors like technology, healthcare, and labor markets.</li>



<li>The Department of Agriculture (USDA) was tasked with bolstering rules under the Packers and Stockyards Act to protect farmers and enable easier equipment repairs (advancing the “right to repair” movement).</li>



<li>The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was encouraged to reinstate net neutrality rules to prevent internet service providers from stifling competition.</li>
</ul>



<p>Specific industries targeted included:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Technology</strong>: Scrutiny of Big Tech mergers and practices that limited innovation.</li>



<li><strong>Agriculture</strong>: Protections against exploitative practices by large agribusinesses.</li>



<li><strong>Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare</strong>: Efforts to curb drug price hikes through merger reviews and competition in medical markets.</li>



<li><strong>Labor and Broadband</strong>: Bans on excessive non-competes and promotion of open internet access.</li>
</ul>



<p>The order also established the White House Competition Council, a 15-member body to coordinate these efforts across agencies. Critics at the time argued it represented overreach, while supporters viewed it as a necessary response to rising corporate power, which they claimed led to higher prices and fewer choices for Americans.</p>



<p>Under the Biden-Harris administration, this framework led to stricter merger guidelines in 2023, increased FTC and DOJ challenges to deals, and initiatives that blocked or modified high-profile mergers in sectors like tech and groceries.</p>



<p><strong>The Revocation: What Happened?</strong></p>



<p>President Trump’s revocation was straightforward and immediate. The new executive order, issued on August 13, 2025, simply states: “Executive Order 14036 of July 9, 2021 (Promoting Competition in the American Economy), is hereby revoked.” It includes standard general provisions ensuring no impairment of existing agency authorities or creation of new legal rights.</p>



<p>The White House framed this as part of a broader agenda to dismantle “burdensome” regulations from the previous administration. The Justice Department quickly endorsed the move, announcing an “America First Antitrust” approach that prioritizes free markets over what it called the “overly prescriptive and burdensome” policies of the Biden era. This includes streamlining merger reviews and reinstating practices like early terminations for uncontroversial deals.</p>



<p>The revocation aligns with other recent Trump actions, such as targeted executive orders on lowering drug prices and reducing regulatory barriers, rather than a sweeping, multi-agency mandate.</p>



<p><strong>What Does the Revocation Mean?</strong></p>



<p>The revocation marks a philosophical pivot in U.S. competition policy. The Biden-Harris order was criticized by some as encouraging “top-down” regulations that picked winners and losers, fostering hostility toward mergers and acquisitions (M&A). By withdrawing it, the Trump administration aims to let markets operate more freely, with the government focusing on enforcing existing antitrust laws passed by Congress rather than expanding regulatory oversight.</p>



<p>Key implications include:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>End of the White House Competition Council</strong>: This inter-agency body, which coordinated efforts on issues like credit card fees and app store practices, is dissolved, potentially reducing holistic government scrutiny of anti-competitive behaviors.</li>



<li><strong>Shift Away from Strict Merger Scrutiny</strong>: The Biden-era guidelines made it harder for large deals to pass muster, leading to blocked mergers (e.g., in airlines and tech). Trump’s approach emphasizes “tailored action” to protect consumers without blanket opposition to consolidation.</li>



<li><strong>Broader Economic Focus</strong>: Proponents argue this will promote growth, innovation, and lower costs by reducing regulatory burdens. Critics, however, warn it could lead to higher prices, fewer choices, and greater corporate power, as seen in statements from figures like Sen. Amy Klobuchar, who called it a “step backward” for consumers and workers.</li>
</ul>



<p>On social media, reactions vary: Some users celebrate it as a win for innovation and against bureaucratic overreach, while others decry it as favoring big business at the expense of everyday Americans, potentially costing billions in fees and losses.</p>



<p><strong>FTC Chairman’s Statement</strong></p>



<p>FTC Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson issued a strong endorsement of the revocation, stating:</p>



<p>“America’s markets are the most dynamic on Earth, responsible for enriching the entire world through technological innovations, lifting countless people out of poverty, and inspiring other countries to emulate our economic system. Our markets thrive when they operate freely and when the Federal government does not pick winners and losers but allows businesses to grow and innovate.</p>



<p>Today’s withdrawal of the Biden-Harris Executive Order on competition marks another break between the last Administration’s failed policies and the Trump-Vance Administration’s focus on protecting everyday Americans from anticompetitive practices through tailored action, promoting economic growth, and ensuring that American workers benefit from competition for their labor.</p>



<p>The now-withdrawn Executive Order encouraged top-down competition regulations, and established a flawed philosophical underpinning for the Biden-Harris Administration’s undue hostility toward mergers and acquisitions. Consistent with President Trump’s recent Executive Orders, the Trump-Vance FTC is devoting its resources to enforcing the antitrust laws passed by Congress, for the benefit of all American consumers and workers—lowering the cost of living, improving the quality of goods and services, fostering new innovations, and leading to ever-greater prosperity for our Nation.”</p>



<p>This statement underscores the administration’s view that the prior order stifled growth, positioning the FTC to prioritize consumer benefits through targeted enforcement.</p>



<p><strong>What Should Businesses Expect from Trump Administration Competition Policy on Mergers?</strong></p>



<p>For businesses, particularly those in merger-heavy sectors like tech, healthcare, and agriculture, the revocation heralds a more permissive environment. Here’s what to anticipate:</p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table class="has-fixed-layout"><thead><tr><td><strong>Aspect</strong></td><td><strong>Biden-Harris Approach</strong></td><td><strong>Trump-Vance Approach</strong></td><td><strong>Implications for Businesses</strong></td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Merger Review Process</strong></td><td>Strict guidelines (2023 revisions) emphasizing potential harms, leading to more challenges and blocks.</td><td>Streamlined Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) reviews, reinstatement of early terminations for non-controversial deals.</td><td>Faster approvals, lower costs, and reduced uncertainty for M&A activity. Expect a surge in deals as regulatory hurdles drop.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Consent Decrees and Settlements</strong></td><td>Rare use; preference for outright blocks.</td><td>More frequent, “well-crafted” decrees to resolve issues without halting mergers.</td><td>Businesses can negotiate fixes (e.g., divestitures) rather than face total rejection, making large-scale consolidations viable again.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Antitrust Enforcement</strong></td><td>Whole-of-government push, challenging past mergers in tech, pharma, etc.</td><td>Focused on “America First” free markets, enforcing congressional laws without expansive directives.</td><td>Less hostility toward “big business”; easier for companies to pursue growth through acquisitions, but still risks if clear violations occur.</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Industry-Specific Impacts</strong></td><td>Heightened scrutiny in agriculture (e.g., farmer protections), tech (e.g., app stores), and healthcare (e.g., drug pricing).</td><td>Tailored actions via separate EOs (e.g., drug prices), less emphasis on sector-wide crackdowns.</td><td>Agribusinesses and tech firms may see fewer barriers to expansion; however, critics warn of potential monopolies leading to higher consumer costs.</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>



<p>Overall, businesses should prepare for a pro-growth stance that favors innovation and efficiency. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce applauded the move, noting it entrusts consumers to “pick winners” in a competitive landscape. That said, not all views are positive—some analysts predict risks like reduced innovation from unchecked consolidation and higher prices for essentials. Companies should monitor DOJ and FTC actions closely, as enforcement will now be more case-by-case.</p>



<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>



<p>Trump’s revocation of EO 14036 resets the competition landscape, moving away from aggressive regulatory intervention toward market-driven policies. While this could unleash economic dynamism and ease M&A for businesses, it raises questions about long-term consumer protections. As the administration implements its vision, stakeholders from Wall Street to Main Street will be watching—and debating—the outcomes. Stay tuned for updates as this policy shift unfolds.</p>



<p>Andre Barlow</p>



<p><a href="mailto:abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com">abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</a></p>



<p>202-589-1838</p>
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                <title><![CDATA[DOJ Settles with Greystar: Ending Algorithmic Pricing in Rental Markets]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/doj-settles-with-greystar-ending-algorithmic-pricing-in-rental-markets/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/doj-settles-with-greystar-ending-algorithmic-pricing-in-rental-markets/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2025 15:16:48 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Civil Non-Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[algorithms]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[antitrust]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Antitrust Division]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[greystar]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[price fixing]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[realpage]]></category>
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Introduction On August 8, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a landmark proposed settlement with Greystar Management Services LLC, the largest landlord in the United States, to address allegations of anticompetitive practices in the rental housing market. This settlement targets Greystar’s use of algorithmic pricing schemes that allegedly stifled competition and drove up&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<h1 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-introduction">Introduction</h1>



<p>On August 8, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a landmark <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-proposed-settlement-greystar-largest-us-landlord-end-its">proposed settlement with Greystar Management Services LLC</a>, the largest landlord in the United States, to address allegations of anticompetitive practices in the rental housing market. This settlement targets Greystar’s use of algorithmic pricing schemes that allegedly stifled competition and drove up rents for millions of American renters. This blog post explores the background of the lawsuit, the details of the settlement, and the key lessons learned from this significant enforcement action.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-background-on-the-lawsuit">Background on the Lawsuit</h2>



<p>Greystar, headquartered in Charleston, South Carolina, manages nearly 950,000 rental units across the country, making it the largest residential property manager in the U.S. The DOJ’s Antitrust Division, alongside several state attorneys general, filed a lawsuit accusing Greystar and five other major landlords of engaging in algorithmic price-fixing through the use of RealPage’s revenue management software. The complaint alleged that these landlords shared competitively sensitive data, such as pricing strategies and rental rates, to generate pricing recommendations that aligned competitors’ rents, effectively reducing competition.</p>



<p>The lawsuit highlighted how RealPage’s algorithms incorporated anticompetitive features, enabling landlords to coordinate pricing strategies and avoid lowering rents, even in softening markets. This practice, according to federal prosecutors, led to artificially inflated rents, with one apartment complex reportedly boasting a 25% rent increase in a single year by using RealPage’s system. The DOJ argued that such coordination, whether through direct communication or algorithms, violated antitrust laws by harming consumers through higher rental costs.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-settlement">The Settlement</h2>



<p>The proposed consent decree, filed on August 8, 2025, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, outlines several key requirements for Greystar to restore competitive practices in the rental market. If approved, Greystar must:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Cease Using Anticompetitive Algorithms</strong>: Greystar is prohibited from using any pricing algorithms that rely on competitors’ sensitive data or incorporate anticompetitive features.</li>



<li><strong>Stop Sharing Sensitive Information</strong>: The settlement bans Greystar from exchanging competitively sensitive information with other landlords.</li>



<li><strong>Accept Monitoring for Third-Party Algorithms</strong>: If Greystar uses a third-party pricing algorithm, it must be certified as compliant with the settlement terms, and a court-appointed monitor will oversee its use.</li>



<li><strong>Avoid RealPage-Hosted Competitor Meetings</strong>: Greystar is barred from participating in RealPage-hosted meetings with competing landlords to prevent further coordination.</li>



<li><strong>Cooperate with DOJ’s Case Against RealPage</strong>: Greystar is required to assist the DOJ in its ongoing monopolization claims against RealPage, the software provider central to the alleged scheme.</li>
</ul>



<p>The settlement, pending court approval following a 60-day public comment period as required by the Tunney Act, also aligns with a separate class-action lawsuit settlement Greystar reached with renters, which includes “significant” monetary damages to be presented for court approval as early as October 2025. Greystar has denied wrongdoing but agreed to the settlements to clarify legal standards and focus on its business operations.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-lessons-learned">Lessons Learned</h2>



<p>This settlement marks a pivotal moment in addressing the impact of technology on market competition, particularly in the housing sector. Several key lessons emerge:</p>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Algorithmic Accountability</strong>: The case underscores the growing scrutiny of algorithms in business practices. While technology can optimize operations, its misuse to coordinate pricing or suppress competition can lead to significant legal and financial consequences.</li>



<li><strong>Consumer Protection in Housing</strong>: The DOJ’s action reflects a broader commitment to protecting working-class Americans from practices that inflate essential costs like rent. As Attorney General Pamela Bondi emphasized, free-market competition is critical to making housing affordable.</li>



<li><strong>Collaboration Between Regulators and Industry</strong>: Greystar’s cooperation with the DOJ’s case against RealPage highlights the importance of industry players working with regulators to address systemic issues, potentially leading to broader reforms in rental pricing practices.</li>



<li><strong>Transparency and Oversight</strong>: The requirement for a court-appointed monitor for third-party algorithms signals the need for robust oversight to ensure compliance with antitrust laws, particularly as technology becomes more embedded in business operations.</li>



<li><strong>Impact on Renters</strong>: While the settlement does not quantify the direct relief for renters, the class-action settlement’s promise of monetary damages suggests that affected tenants may see some financial recourse, emphasizing the role of collective action in addressing widespread harm.</li>
</ol>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-conclusion">Conclusion</h2>



<p>The DOJ’s proposed settlement with Greystar is a significant step toward curbing anticompetitive practices in the U.S. rental market. By targeting algorithmic price-fixing, the settlement aims to restore competition and protect renters from inflated costs. As the case against RealPage and other landlords continues, this action sets a precedent for how regulators will address the intersection of technology and market fairness. For renters, industry stakeholders, and policymakers, this settlement serves as a reminder that competition, not coordination, should drive affordability in housing.</p>



<p>Andre Barlow</p>



<p>202-589-1838</p>



<p>abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>



<p></p>
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                <title><![CDATA[Incomplete Production Costs Amedisys $1.1M in DOJ Settlement]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/incomplete-production-costs-amedisys-1-1m-in-doj-settlement/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/incomplete-production-costs-amedisys-1-1m-in-doj-settlement/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2025 14:57:20 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>The Department of Justice (DOJ) recently finalized a settlement in UnitedHealth’s proposed acquisition of Amedisys, imposing sweeping divestitures and a striking $1.1 million civil penalty. The penalty stems from the DOJ’s allegation that Amedisys falsely certified “substantial compliance” with a Second Request for information, despite knowing its document production was incomplete. This rare penalty underscores&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>The Department of Justice (DOJ) recently finalized a settlement in UnitedHealth’s proposed acquisition of Amedisys, imposing sweeping divestitures and a <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-broad-divestitures-resolve-challenge-unitedhealths-acquisition">striking $1.1 million civil penalty</a>. The penalty stems from the DOJ’s allegation that Amedisys falsely certified “substantial compliance” with a Second Request for information, despite knowing its document production was incomplete. This rare penalty underscores the high stakes of claiming compliance without robust supporting efforts, serving as a wake-up call for companies navigating antitrust reviews.</p>



<p><strong>Settlement Details</strong></p>



<p>To resolve the DOJ’s challenge, joined by the Attorneys General of Maryland, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York, Amedisys agreed to pay a $1.1 million civil penalty and implement antitrust compliance training for key executives and employees. The DOJ alleged that Amedisys violated the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (HSR Act) by falsely certifying compliance with a Second Request while aware of significant gaps in its document production. The settlement also mandates divestitures of 164 home health and hospice locations across 19 states, which the DOJ hailed as “the largest divestiture of outpatient healthcare services to resolve a merger challenge.”</p>



<p><strong>HSR Act Merger Review Process</strong></p>



<p>Under the HSR Act, parties to mergers meeting specific thresholds must file a pre-merger notification with the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and observe a 30-day waiting period before closing. If further scrutiny is needed, the reviewing agency may issue a Second Request, requiring extensive documents and data about the companies, transaction, and industry. This pauses the waiting period until the parties certify “substantial compliance,” attesting that their submissions are “true, correct, and complete.” If documents are unavailable, parties must provide a statement explaining noncompliance. Failure to comply risks a civil penalty of up to $53,088 per day.</p>



<p><strong>The Complaint</strong></p>



<p>Announced on June 5, 2023, UnitedHealth’s proposed acquisition of Amedisys aimed to combine two major players in home health and hospice care. UnitedHealth, through its Optum subsidiary, and Amedisys, a provider of home hospice and high-acuity care, faced scrutiny for potential harm to competition in numerous local markets. On November 12, 2024, the DOJ and state co-plaintiffs filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland to block the deal, alleging it would stifle competition in home health, hospice, and nurse labor markets.</p>



<p>The complaint also charged Amedisys with violating the HSR Act by falsely certifying substantial compliance despite known deficiencies, including:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Missing Emails</strong>: Amedisys failed to disclose that a 30-day email archive gap coincided with key acquisition negotiations, omitting a required statement of noncompliance.</li>



<li><strong>Unproduced Hard Copy Documents</strong>: Amedisys neglected to provide any hard copy documents, including “copious handwritten notes” from its former CEO, publicly referenced in a 2023 book.</li>



<li><strong>Omitted Text Messages</strong>: Text messages from over half of Amedisys’s custodians were not produced.</li>
</ul>



<p>After DOJ confrontation, Amedisys produced over 2.5 million additional documents, including critical materials like an email from its CEO assessing transaction risks and a text message discussing UnitedHealth’s market consolidation. The DOJ alleged Amedisys was noncompliant for at least 252 days, risking over $13 million in penalties.</p>



<p><strong>Settlement</strong></p>



<p>The settlement requires Amedisys to pay a $1.1 million civil penalty and train its corporate and field leadership on antitrust compliance for falsely certifying that the company had truthfully, correctly, and completely responded to the DOJ’s requests for documents.  Amedisys must train its CEO, CFO, COO, chief legal officer, and field leadership on antitrust compliance, with the DOJ approving the training content. </p>



<p><strong>Key Takeaways</strong></p>



<p>This settlement highlights critical lessons for companies in merger reviews:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>“Substantial Compliance” Is Serious</strong>: Agencies may reject incomplete certifications, delaying mergers and imposing hefty penalties. Close coordination with antitrust counsel is essential to ensure compliance with Second Request demands.</li>



<li><strong>Thorough Document Collection</strong>: The case emphasizes the need for comprehensive collection of hard copy and text message documents, aligning with recent DOJ and FTC guidance on preserving data from collaboration tools and ephemeral messaging platforms.</li>
</ul>



<p>This case serves as a stark reminder: cutting corners on compliance can lead to costly consequences.</p>



<p>Andre Barlow</p>



<p>abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>



<p></p>



<p></p>
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                <title><![CDATA[DOJ Settlement Paves Way for UnitedHealth’s $3.3 Billion Acquisition of Amedisys]]></title>
                <link>https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/doj-settlement-paves-way-for-unitedhealths-3-3-billion-acquisition-of-amedisys/</link>
                <guid isPermaLink="true">https://www.dbmlawgroup.com/blog/doj-settlement-paves-way-for-unitedhealths-3-3-billion-acquisition-of-amedisys/</guid>
                <dc:creator><![CDATA[Andre Barlow]]></dc:creator>
                <pubDate>Mon, 11 Aug 2025 14:38:43 GMT</pubDate>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ Antitrust Highlights]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[Merger Highlights]]></category>
                
                
                    <category><![CDATA[amedisys]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[antitrust]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[DOJ]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[merger remedy]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[unh]]></category>
                
                    <category><![CDATA[unitedhealth]]></category>
                
                
                
                <description><![CDATA[<p>Introduction On August 7, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division, along with state co-plaintiffs from Maryland, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York, announced a proposed settlement to resolve their challenge to UnitedHealth Group Incorporated’s $3.3 billion acquisition of Amedisys Inc. This settlement, which requires the divestiture of 164 home health and hospice&hellip;</p>
]]></description>
                <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<h1 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-introduction">Introduction</h1>



<p>On August 7, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division, along with state co-plaintiffs from Maryland, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York, announced a <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-broad-divestitures-resolve-challenge-unitedhealths-acquisition">proposed settlement</a> to resolve their challenge to UnitedHealth Group Incorporated’s $3.3 billion acquisition of Amedisys Inc. This settlement, which requires the divestiture of 164 home health and hospice facilities across 19 states, marks a significant step in addressing antitrust concerns in the healthcare sector. This post explores the background of the lawsuit, the rejected remedies, the details of the divestiture, and the lessons learned about the DOJ’s preference for structural remedies.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-background-of-the-lawsuit">Background of the Lawsuit</h2>



<p>In June 2023, UnitedHealth’s subsidiary Optum agreed to acquire Amedisys, a leading home health and hospice provider based in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for $3.3 billion. UnitedHealth, headquartered in Eden Prairie, Minnesota, is a vertically integrated healthcare giant, operating as an insurer, provider, pharmacy benefit manager, and healthcare software vendor. The acquisition raised red flags for the DOJ, particularly because UnitedHealth had acquired Amedisys’s primary competitor, LHC Group, in 2023 for $5.4 billion. T<a href="https://homehealthcarenews.com/2024/11/evaluating-the-dojs-arguments-against-the-unitedhealth-group-amedisys-deal/">he DOJ, joined by four states, filed a lawsuit in November 2024 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland to block the merger</a>, arguing it would significantly reduce competition in the home health and hospice markets.</p>



<p>The DOJ’s concerns centered on the potential for UnitedHealth to dominate the market, controlling 30% or more of home health or hospice services in eight states and expanding into five additional states for the first time. The lawsuit claimed the merger would harm hundreds of thousands of vulnerable patients by limiting access to affordable, high-quality care and reducing wage competition for thousands of nurses. The DOJ labeled the deal “presumptively anticompetitive and illegal,” citing its potential to consolidate nearly 800 local home health and hospice markets.</p>



<p>In addition, the DOJ <a href="https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/unitedhealth-group-abandons-two-acquisitions-following-antitrust-division-scrutiny">forced UnitedHealth to abandon acquisitions plans for other providers</a>.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-rejected-remedies">Rejected Remedies</h2>



<p>To address the DOJ’s concerns, UnitedHealth and Amedisys proposed multiple divestiture plans, but at least two were publicly rejected. The first, proposed in the summer of 2024, involved selling assets to VCG Luna, a subsidiary of Texas-based VitalCaring Group. The DOJ rejected this plan, deeming VCG Luna an unreliable buyer to maintain competition in the affected markets. The second attempt, in spring 2025, involved divestitures to BrightSpring Health Services and The Pennant Group. <a href="https://hospicenews.com/2025/05/12/doj-rejects-amedisys-unitedhealths-divestiture-to-brightspring-pennant/">This proposal was also rejected</a>, as it failed to fully address the DOJ’s concerns about market consolidation. These rejections underscored the DOJ’s rigorous standards for ensuring that divestitures restore competition effectively.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-the-approved-divestiture-and-remedy">The Approved Divestiture and Remedy</h2>



<p>The proposed settlement, filed on August 7, 2025, resolves the DOJ’s concerns by requiring UnitedHealth and Amedisys to divest 164 home health and hospice locations, including one palliative care facility, across 19 states. These facilities generate approximately $528 million in annual revenue, making this the largest divestiture of outpatient healthcare services to resolve a merger challenge. The divested assets will be sold to BrightSpring Health Services and The Pennant Group, with BrightSpring acquiring 115 sites and Pennant acquiring 49, primarily home health facilities.</p>



<p>The settlement includes several key provisions to ensure competitive balance:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Additional Divestitures</strong>: UnitedHealth must divest eight additional locations if regulatory approval for the initial 164 facilities is not obtained.</li>



<li><strong>Oversight</strong>: A monitor will supervise the divestiture process and ensure compliance with the consent decree.</li>



<li><strong>Support for Buyers</strong>: The agreement provides buyers with the assets, personnel, and relationships needed to compete effectively against UnitedHealth in overlapping markets.</li>



<li><strong>Antitrust Compliance</strong>: Amedisys will pay a $1.1 million civil penalty for falsely certifying compliance with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and must train its leadership on antitrust compliance.</li>
</ul>



<p>The divestitures, concentrated in the Southeast where UnitedHealth’s LHC Group has a strong presence, aim to preserve competition for patients and nurses. The settlement also requires UnitedHealth to divest stakes in 10 joint ventures and includes protections to prevent interference with the buyers’ ability to compete. The proposal is subject to a 60-day public comment period under the Tunney Act, after which a Maryland district judge will determine if it serves the public interest.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading" id="h-lessons-learned-the-doj-s-preference-for-structural-remedies">Lessons Learned: The DOJ’s Preference for Structural Remedies</h2>



<p>The UnitedHealth-Amedisys settlement highlights the DOJ Antitrust Division’s strong preference for structural remedies over behavioral ones in merger cases. Structural remedies, such as divestitures, physically alter the market by transferring assets to new competitors, ensuring long-term competition without ongoing oversight. In this case, the DOJ rejected earlier proposals that did not sufficiently restore competition, opting instead for a robust divestiture of 164 facilities to established players like BrightSpring and Pennant.  The DOJ’s insistence on structural remedies reflects its belief that competition in healthcare is critical to protecting vulnerable patients and workers. By requiring divestitures across 19 states, the DOJ ensures that the home health and hospice markets remain competitive. </p>



<p>Andre Barlow</p>



<p>202-589-1838</p>



<p>abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com</p>



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