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FTC and Bipartisan State AGs Sue to Block Covetrus’s $3.5 Billion Acquisition of MWI: A Classic Horizontal Challenge Focused on Distribution Middlemen
On November 13, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission and attorneys general from 13 states filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to block Covetrus Inc. (and its private-equity owners Clayton, Dubilier & Rice and TPG) from acquiring MWI Veterinary Supply Inc. (MWI Animal Health) from Cencora Inc. for approximately $3.5 billion. The Commission authorized the action by a 2-0 vote. The parties have agreed to a temporary restraining order preventing closing before December 4, 2026.
Background
Covetrus and MWI are the two largest national distributors of veterinary pharmaceuticals, vaccines, surgical supplies, “white goods” (gloves, gauze, syringes), and related products and services to independent veterinary clinics and large corporate practice groups. A third national player, Patterson Veterinary, also operates in the space; the FTC’s theory centers on the two largest firms. The deal was announced around mid-March 2026. As veterinary care costs have risen substantially in recent years, the parties positioned the combination as a way to improve clinic economics, service, and innovation.
Facing scrutiny, Covetrus retained Miller Strategies, the government-relations firm founded by Republican lobbyist Jeff Miller, to advocate for the transaction. In October 2026 the parties submitted a formal remedy package to the FTC and state enforcers. Regulators concluded the package was insufficient to protect competition.
The Complaint: Horizontal Overlap, Narrow Markets, and Elimination of Head-to-Head Competition
The FTC and the state AGs (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and Texas) allege that the transaction would substantially lessen competition in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act.
The complaint defines two relevant markets: (1) veterinary clinic distribution and (2) distribution to large corporate accounts. In these markets Covetrus and MWI are the two largest suppliers. Their national networks of distribution centers allow rapid delivery and the offering of volume discounts and rebates that smaller or regional rivals cannot match. The combined firm would control more than 50 percent of the relevant markets and create highly concentrated markets that are presumptively unlawful under prevailing case law and the 2023 FTC-DOJ Merger Guidelines.
The core theory is the elimination of intense head-to-head competition. The complaint alleges that Covetrus and MWI have engaged in an “all-out price war.” When MWI pursued aggressive pricing, Covetrus responded by lowering its own prices and expanding rebates through its VetSuite program. This rivalry intensified with the rise of Vetcove, an online platform that lets veterinarians compare prices across distributors and use one firm’s quote against the other in negotiations. Corporate groups routinely play the two companies against each other; independent clinics benefit from the same dynamic. The FTC argues that specialty distributors, manufacturers selling direct, retailers, and other fringe suppliers do not impose a meaningful competitive constraint on the full-line national distributors because of structural barriers to entry and scale advantages in logistics, inventory, and rebate programs.
The predicted effects are higher prices and costs for veterinary clinics, reduced service quality and investment in customer support, and higher prices ultimately borne by pet owners.
The Parties’ Antitrust Defense
Covetrus immediately announced it would fight the case in court. In a November 13 statement the company called the FTC’s approach “a narrow and outdated view of the market.” It argues that veterinary practices today have far more purchasing options than a traditional middleman-distributor analysis captures:
- Direct manufacturer sales: Nearly all practices buy some products directly from manufacturers, some of which maintain larger sales forces than the distributors themselves.
- Other national and regional distributors.
- Online veterinary marketplaces used by more than 60 percent of U.S. practices, which allow comparison shopping and ordering from 40-plus distributors and thousands of manufacturers in a single cart.
- Retailer disintermediation: Retailers sell flea-and-tick treatments, pharmaceuticals, and pet foods directly to pet owners, bypassing both distributors and clinics.
Covetrus contends that clinics routinely multi-source, switch suppliers regularly, and have seen prices pressured downward by this broader competitive set. All suppliers rely on the same parcel carriers (UPS, USPS, FedEx). The company maintains that the merger will improve efficiencies, lower the cost of serving practices, and support innovation and reliability without harming competition.
Lessons Learned
- The FTC continues to work closely with bipartisan groups of state attorneys general to protect competition. The coalition spans red and blue states and reflects coordinated federal-state enforcement on a horizontal deal affecting clinics and pet owners nationwide.
- The FTC is willing to rely on a relatively narrow market definition focused on full-line middleman distribution. It treats national veterinary clinic distributors as the relevant competitive arena and discounts direct manufacturer sales, online comparison platforms, and retail channels as insufficient constraints on the core distribution function that clinics rely upon for rapid, full-line supply and scale rebates.
- The FTC still challenges deals it concludes are anticompetitive even after lobbying efforts and a proposed remedy package. Hiring a well-connected lobbying firm and offering concessions in October did not deter the agency and the states from filing for a permanent injunction once they determined the competitive harm remained.
This case will turn on whether courts accept the agencies’ narrow distribution markets and evidence of head-to-head price and service rivalry, or whether they credit the parties’ broader competitive picture of manufacturer direct sales, digital marketplaces, and retail channels. The complaint is a reminder that the FTC is willing to block deals where the evidence tends to show .
Andre Barlow
abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com






