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Virginia State Bar

FTC and Bipartisan States Force Abandonment of PlayPower’s Acquisition of BCI Burke

Andre Barlow

On October 19, 2026, the Federal Trade Commission and a bipartisan coalition of 12 state attorneys general sued in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to block Platinum Equity and its portfolio company PlayPower from acquiring BCI Burke, one of PlayPower’s closest competitors in commercial outdoor playground equipment. Just eight days later, on October 27, the parties abandoned the deal. The rapid outcome underscores the continued potency of coordinated federal-state horizontal merger challenges, even when the parties retain prominent lobbying support.

Background and the Challenge

PlayPower, acquired by Platinum Equity in 2025, already controlled multiple commercial playground brands, including Miracle Recreation, Little Tikes Commercial, and Playworld Systems—acquired in prior transactions. BCI Burke, owned by Bertram Capital, was a leading independent competitor, particularly strong in smaller and medium-sized projects for schools, parks, churches, and municipalities. The top five manufacturers (including PlayPower and Burke) controlled roughly 85% to 90% of the U.S. market for commercial outdoor playground equipment. The proposed deal would have reduced the number of major competitors from five to four and given the combined firm more than 30% of the market.

The FTC, joined by the attorneys general of Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin, alleged that the transaction violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act. The complaint focused on a national market for commercial outdoor playground equipment. It alleged that PlayPower and Burke were intense head-to-head rivals that competed on price, quality, safety, innovation, and service. Customers—especially public entities spending hundreds of millions of dollars annually—benefited from that rivalry. The agencies argued that the merger would eliminate this direct competition, raise prices, reduce quality and innovation, and leave smaller or niche manufacturers unable to constrain the combined firm because of barriers involving distribution, sales forces, safety certifications, manufacturing capacity, and product breadth.

The Commission voted 2-0 to authorize the permanent-injunction action. The case was part of a broader pattern in which PlayPower had previously acquired rivals rather than outcompete them.

Lobbying Efforts and Their Failure

In an effort to secure regulatory approval, PlayPower retained Miller Strategies, the Washington, D.C. government-relations firm founded by Jeff Miller, to lobby on antitrust and related issues. Lobbying disclosures show the firm registered for the company and reported substantial fees in 2026 for work on labor, antitrust, and workplace matters. Despite those efforts, the FTC and the bipartisan state coalition proceeded with the lawsuit. The parties later cited the time and expense of protracted litigation as reasons for abandoning the transaction.

Termination and Agency Reaction

On October 26–27, 2026, PlayPower and BCI Burke mutually terminated their merger agreement. In a statement, PlayPower’s CEO maintained that the companies would have prevailed on the merits, arguing the FTC and states misunderstood a fragmented and globally competitive market and that the combined firm would have held less than 30% share. The companies emphasized continued focus on their separate businesses.

FTC Bureau of Competition Director Daniel Guarnera called the abandonment “a win for American consumers” that would help keep prices lower for schools, churches, daycares, and parks departments. He noted that taxpayers are major beneficiaries of continued head-to-head competition and that children and families would benefit from higher quality, better service, and greater innovation. He thanked FTC staff and the state partners, and stated that the agency would continue to protect consumers from deals that raise prices, reduce quality, or lessen innovation.

Lessons

This case illustrates several recurring features of current merger enforcement. First, the FTC continues to partner with bipartisan groups of state attorneys general on horizontal deals that affect public purchasers and everyday consumers. Second, the agency is prepared to challenge combinations of close rivals in already concentrated markets—even when the parties argue the market is broader or more fragmented and even after they retain well-connected lobbyists. Third, when the agencies assemble a strong evidentiary record of head-to-head competition and structural concentration (here, top-five control of 85–90% and a post-merger share exceeding 30%), the prospect of a full trial can be sufficient to cause the parties to abandon the deal rather than litigate. For private-equity-backed serial acquirers in concentrated manufacturing or equipment markets serving public customers, the PlayPower-Burke episode is a clear reminder that lobbying and efficiency or “complementary brand” arguments may not overcome documented rivalry and high concentration under the current guidelines and enforcement posture.

Andre Barlow

abarlow@dbmlawgroup.com

Aerial view of Washington DC cityscape from Arlington Virginia USA.

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